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ABSTRACT
Virtually every significant legal doctrine in IP is either about
whether the plaintiff has a valid IP right that the law will recognize
(validity); whether the defendant’s conduct violates that right (in-
fringement); or whether the defendant is somehow privileged to
violate that right (defenses). IP regimes tend to separate doctrines in
these three legal categories relatively strictly. They apply different
burdens of proof and persuasion to infringement and validity. In
many cases they ask different actors to decide one doctrine but not
the other. And even where none of that is true, the nature of IP law
is to categorize an argument in order to apply the proper rules for
that argument.
The result of this separation is that parties treat IP rights “like a
nose of wax, which may be turned and twisted in any direction.”
When infringement is at issue, IP owners tout the breadth of their
rights, while accused infringers seek to cabin them within narrow
bounds. When it comes to validity, however, the parties reverse their
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positions, with IP owners emphasizing the narrowness of their rights
in order to avoid having those rights held invalid and accused in-
fringers arguing the reverse. Because of the separation between valid-
ity, infringement, and defenses, it is often possible for a party to
successfully argue that an IP right means one thing in one context
and something very different in another. And courts will not neces-
sarily detect the problem because they are thinking of only the precise
legal issue before them. The result is a number of IP doctrines that
simply make no sense to an outsider.
The culprit is simple, but fundamental: IP regimes largely lack an
integrated procedure for deciding the proper extent of an IP right.
Without some way of assessing the breadth of an IP right that consid-
ers validity, infringement, and defenses together, courts will always
be prone to make mistakes in applying any one of the doctrines
separately. In this Article, we suggest that IP regimes need a process
for determining the scope of an IP right.
Scope is not merely validity, and it is not merely infringement.
Rather, it refers to the range of things the IP right lawfully protects
against competition. Only by evaluating scope in a single, integrated
fashion can courts avoid the nose of wax problem that has grown
endemic in IP law. Scope is, quite simply, the fundamental question
that underlies everything else in IP law, but which courts rarely
think about expressly.
2016] SCOPE 2199
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INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property (IP) law doctrines fall into three basic
categories: validity, infringement, and defenses. Virtually every sig-
nificant legal doctrine in IP is either about whether the plaintiff has
a valid IP right that the law will recognize (validity); whether what
the defendant did violates that right (infringement); or whether the
defendant is somehow privileged to violate that right (defenses).1
IP regimes tend to separate doctrines in these three legal cate-
gories relatively strictly. They apply different burdens of proof and
persuasion to infringement and validity. In many cases they ask dif-
ferent actors to decide one doctrine but not the other. The U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), for example, decides questions
of patent and trademark validity but not questions of infringement.
Even in court, resolution of one issue is often allocated to a judge
while the jury decides a different issue. And even if none of that is
true in a given case, the nature of IP law is to categorize an argu-
ment in order to apply the proper rules for that argument.
The result of this separation is that parties treat IP rights “like
a nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction.”2
When infringement is at issue, IP owners tout the breadth of their
rights, while accused infringers seek to cabin them within narrow
bounds. When it comes to validity, however, the parties reverse
their positions: IP owners emphasize the narrowness of their rights
in order to avoid having those rights held invalid, and accused
infringers argue the reverse.3
Because of the separation between validity, infringement, and
defenses, a party may often successfully argue that an IP right
means one thing in one context and something very different in
1. If the IP owner prevails, there are also issues about the remedy awarded. We do not
consider remedial issues in this Article. Nor do we consider trade secrets or the right of pub-
licity, even though both are arguably IP rights and implicate the questions we consider. We’d
say they are outside the scope of our Article, but that would be a bit too meta even for us.
2. White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886).
3. See, e.g., Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and
Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 267-68 (2008) (“[Lawyers] can
argue doctrinal questions of originality in terms that assume a cumulative process of creation
and switch without blinking to arguing questions of infringement in terms that assume a
sharp distinction between an original and a derivative.”).
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another. And decisionmakers won’t necessarily detect the problem
because they are thinking of only the precise legal issue before
them.
The result is a number of IP doctrines that simply make no sense
to an outsider. In patent law, for instance, it is accepted law that
there is no “practicing the prior art” defense.4 In other words, one
can be held liable for doing precisely what others had legally done
before, even though a patent isn’t supposed to cover things people
have already done. In design patent law, one can be held liable for
making a design that an “ordinary observer” would find too similar
to a patented design, even though the things that make the two look
similar—say, the roundness of the wheels on a car—are not things
the patentee is entitled to own. In copyright, once a court has con-
cluded that the defendant has actually copied from the plaintiff, her
song may be deemed infringing because of its similarity to the
plaintiff ’s, even if the similarity is overwhelmingly attributable to
unprotectable standard components of the genre. And in trademark,
a party can be deemed infringing because its products look too
similar to the plaintiff’s and therefore make confusion likely, even
if that confusion is attributable to non-source-designating features
of the design.
Because they are sometimes sensitive to this problem, courts have
created various stopgap doctrines to try to deal with these holes in
IP law. In copyright law, for instance, expression cannot be protec-
ted if there are few alternative means of expression, such that one
author’s way of putting something has “merged” with the idea she
is expressing.5 Trademark law has tried to prevent overreaching
in product configuration protection by making it hard to have a
valid product configuration trade dress at all.6 Patent disclosure
doctrines (written description and enablement) try to solve this
problem with patent claiming.7 But even these efforts to patch the
system are doomed to fail at determining the proper scope of an IP
right for the simple reason that they are themselves either validity
4. See infra Part II.C.2.
5. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967).
6. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000).
7. For a discussion of claiming, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and
Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 809 (2011).
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or infringement doctrines and are therefore subject to the same nose
of wax problem as different decisionmakers tackle different pieces
of the issue at different times.
The culprit is simple, but fundamental: IP regimes largely lack an
integrated procedure for deciding the proper extent of an IP right.
The proper scope of an IP right is not a matter of natural right or
immutable definition. Rather, it is a function of the purposes of the
IP regime. But without some way of assessing the breadth of an IP
right that considers validity, infringement, and defenses together,
courts will always be prone to make mistakes in applying any one
of the doctrines. In general, these mistakes tend to redound to the
benefit of IP owners, as courts are more reluctant to declare an IP
right invalid altogether even when the defendant should not be lia-
ble for infringement. But sometimes the mistakes run the other
way, as when the plaintiff ’s improper attempt to expand the scope
of her legitimate but narrow right leads a court to hold that right
altogether invalid.
In this Article, we suggest that IP regimes need a process for
determining the scope of an IP right. Scope is not merely validity,
and it is not merely infringement. Rather, it refers to the range of
things the IP right lawfully protects against competition.8 IP rights
that claim too broad a scope tend to be invalid, either because they
tread on the rights of those who came before or because they cover
things that the law has decided no one should own. IP rights with
narrower scope are valid, but the narrowness of that scope should
be reflected in the determination of what actions do and do not
infringe that right. And whatever the doctrinal label, we should not
allow an IP owner to capture something that is not within the
8. Some academic works think about the scope of an IP right in an integrated way, al-
though usually only with one IP regime in mind and without our focus on the gaps between
validity, infringement, and defenses. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers
in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1675 (2003) (evaluating patent policy levers in part on the
basis of how they affect the scope of rights in different industries); Bernard Chao, The
Infringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359, 1359 (2014) (“For many years, patent law
has struggled with the issue of permissible claim scope.”); Mark A. Lemley, The Changing
Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 119-21 (2005) (discussing the scope
of patent claims in an integrated way); Zahr K. Said, Reforming Copyright Interpretation, 28
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 516 (2015) (arguing for a judicial determination of scope in copyright
proceedings). Chao goes on to suggest calibrating remedies as a way to modulate claim scope.
Chao, supra, at 1404-07.
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legitimate scope of her right. Nor should it follow from the fact that
some uses are outside the lawful scope of an IP owner’s right that
the IP right itself is invalid and cannot be asserted against anyone.
Only by evaluating scope in a single, integrated proceeding can
courts avoid the nose of wax problem that has grown endemic in IP
law. Scope is, quite simply, the fundamental question that underlies
everything else in IP law, but which courts rarely think about
expressly.
One IP regime—utility patent law—has started in the last two
decades to think about scope in a more systematic way through the
process of claim construction. Patent courts hold a pretrial Mark-
man hearing to determine what the patent does and does not cover;
they use that determination to inform both validity and infringe-
ment.9 Claim construction has its share of problems,10 and patent
law has not entirely avoided the nose of wax problem, but we think
patent law is on the right track in trying to resolve these questions
in an integrated fashion rather than allowing inconsistent assess-
ments of scope in separate validity and infringement proceedings.11
Other IP regimes can look to a modified form of the Markman model
as they design their own doctrines of scope, learning from its short-
comings while trying to modulate the breadth of permissible IP
rights.
In Part I, we discuss the current divided structure of IP regimes,
explaining how validity, infringement, and defenses are often eval-
uated at different times by different parties applying different
standards. We also explain why this separation has taken on in-
creased importance in recent years. In Part II, we discuss the
problematic consequences of that separation for each of the major
IP regimes. Finally, in Part III we propose that IP adopt a unified
scope proceeding, drawing inspiration—but also some caution—from
patent law’s Markman experiment.
9. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384-91 (1996).
10. For a discussion, see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Re-
thinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1744 (2009).
11. See Lemley, supra note 8, at 122. 
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I. IP LITIGATION: A PROCESS DIVIDED
A. The Scope of IP Rights
IP cases have a familiar tripartite structure. The first question is
whether the plaintiff owns any valid rights. If (and only if) the
plaintiff does have valid rights, then the second question is whether
the defendant’s conduct infringes those rights. Third is the question
of whether the defendant might have some defense or special exclu-
sion that exempts from liability its otherwise infringing conduct.
More particular doctrines are then conceived of as validity or in-
fringement issues, or as matters of defense. The allocation into one
of these buckets matters because the consequences of treating some
doctrine as a validity rather than an infringement doctrine are often
different. Validity doctrines tend to have all-or-nothing effect, so a
finding against the claimant on one of these doctrines typically leads
to the conclusion that the claimant has no rights at all. Infringe-
ment doctrines, on the other hand, tend to focus on the conduct of a
particular defendant, so a finding on one of these doctrines typically
applies only as against that defendant. Validity and infringement
doctrines also may be decided by different decisionmakers.
This kind of rigid separation between validity, infringement, and
defenses often doesn’t work, however, because most of the important
questions in modern IP cases are really questions of the scope of a
party’s rights, and scope has a variety of different dimensions that
don’t fit neatly into these doctrinal categories. Indeed, though they
tend not to get headline billing, questions of scope are pervasive
throughout IP cases. And the correct scope of an IP right is not
found in nature; it is determined by a series of policy judgments. 
In each area, courts first must determine the thing to which
rights might attach: What is the invention, the design, the work, or
the mark?12 This is, in the first instance, a question of what a party
claims to own. But it’s not that simple. For one thing, the IP sys-
tems differ from each other in their claiming requirements—in
12. Cf. Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 381, 383 (2005) (discouraging the focus on “rights in things” and encouraging
the examination of “the origins of things”).
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terms of timing, claiming methodology, and specificity.13 Patent
owners arrive at court with a document that (however unclearly)
spells out their claims in writing or, in the case of design patents, in
pictures. Copyright owners allege infringement of some work of
authorship that can serve as a starting point, but they have not ar-
ticulated specifically which aspects of that work warrant protection.
Trademark owners sometimes assert rights in registered marks, for
which the registration depicts the mark and identifies the goods and
services in connection with which the mark is used. But plenty of
trademark claimants assert rights in unregistered marks, the
boundaries of which may be unclear. And uncertainty remains even
in cases involving registered marks. For one thing, courts typically
focus on the nature of the plaintiff ’s use rather than the form of the
mark or goods and services identified in the registration.14 And the
identified goods and services would only be the beginning of the
inquiry even if courts did focus on the registration because the de-
fendant need not use its mark for identical goods; its use need only
be similar enough that confusion is likely (in consideration of other
factors). 
This first kind of scope assessment aims to define the invention,
work, or mark at issue, primarily so that a court can determine
whether the claimed property is subject to valid rights at all. One
significant part of the validity determination in every area of IP is
a comparison of the claimed IP with what came before it. Almost all
IP regimes premise protection on some form of novelty—the in-
vention or creation of a new thing the world has not seen before.15
But truly new creations are rare things. Almost all IP owners add
their contributions onto a base of prior knowledge.16 And, for various
13. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 719
(2009). 
14. See Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American
Trademark Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 40-46), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2735013 [https://perma.cc/LP5M-J9BA].
15. Even trademark law, which does not require novelty per se, typically awards rights
to the party that first uses a mark in connection with particular goods or services. For
example, Apple Inc. did not invent the term “apple,” but it was the first to use it to indicate
the source of computers.
16. Copyright, of course, does not require novelty in the sense that the work must be
different from what came before it. Indeed, as a matter of black letter doctrine, copyright
attaches to any work independently created (not copied from others) with a modicum of
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policy reasons, IP regimes simply do not count some features, no
matter how different they might be from what came before them.
Patent law will not protect laws of nature or abstract ideas, even if
they are novel and nonobvious;17 copyright law will not protect ideas
or processes no matter how original they are;18 trademark law will
not protect functional features even if they are source-indicating.19
Thus, one important purpose of asking “what is it?” is to be able to
test whether valid rights attach in relation to a unit of the claimed
scope, and in particular which features of the claimed property are
protectable.20
Importantly, all IP regimes recognize that a party can own some
valid rights in a work despite the fact that many features of the
work are not protectable. One can, for example, patent an invention
that incorporates many elements of prior inventions, as long as the
newly claimed invention adds some novel and nonobvious new ele-
ment.21 Similarly, one can own a valid copyright on expressions of
facts or on photographs of well-known places,22 just as one can claim
creativity. But that rule is more theoretical than practically applicable—courts almost
universally treat “striking similarity” between works as strong evidence of copying. And more
to our point, the scope of copyright protection in a work that is identical to other preexisting
works would be vanishingly small. The plaintiff would have to prove that the defendant’s
work was copied from the plaintiff rather than from the preexisting work. 
17. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
19. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1995).
20. See Madison, supra note 12, at 397-98; Michael J. Madison, IP Things as Boundary
Objects: The Case of the Copyrighted Work 33-34 (Univ. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2013-12, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2256255 [https://perma.cc/RB36-CZ5X].
21. Cf. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418-19 (2007) (“Although common
sense directs one to look with care at a patent application that claims as innovation the
combination of two known devices according to their established functions, it can be important
to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field
to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does. This is so because
inventions in most, if not all, instances rely upon building blocks long since uncovered, and
claimed discoveries almost of necessity will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already
known.”). 
22. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (“Factual
compilations, on the other hand, may possess the requisite originality. The compilation author
typically chooses which facts to include, in what order to place them, and how to arrange the
collected data so that they may be used effectively by readers. These choices as to selection
and arrangement, so long as they are made independently by the compiler and entail a
minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently original that Congress may protect such com-
pilations through the copyright laws.”).
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trademark rights in phrases with descriptive words or product
packaging with some standard features.23 In patent law we refer to
the features that make an invention patentable collectively as the
“point of novelty.”24 Copyright and trademark law lack a similar
term, but they have the same concept. Those features that are new
and are not excluded from protection for policy reasons can be the
basis of protection for a work as a whole, but that which was taken
from the prior art or otherwise excluded from protection cannot be
protected separately. 
These determinations, which together define the nature of a
party’s entitlement, are in some ways analogous to the ones that
frame disputes about real property. In order to determine whether
a party has violated the owner’s rights in a piece of property, a court
must first determine the metes and bounds of the property claimed
and the interest the claimant has in that property (that is, was the
property taken in fee simple, or is the interest a future interest, a
lease, etc.?). Similarly, to determine whether a party has violated an
IP owner’s rights, a court must first determine what constitutes the
invention, the work, or the mark. But unlike real property, no mat-
ter what the claiming rules, delineating the boundaries of the IP
right requires interpretation, and that interpretation is necessarily
done in the shadow of legal rules. That leads us to the second type
of scope inquiry, which focuses on the nature of a party’s rights in
the property.
Once we know what the IP owner has in fact contributed to the
world, we can ask what acts violate rights in that property. This
inquiry also has embedded within it several questions related to
scope. Every IP system determines infringement by reference to
both the acts that cannot be undertaken in relation to the subject of
IP rights and the level of the similarity between the defendant’s
invention, work, or mark and that of the plaintiff.25 Patent, for
23. See Antioch Co. v. W. Trimming Corp., 347 F.3d 150, 158 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[I]n order
to receive trade dress protection for the overall combination of functional features, those
features must be configured in an arbitrary, fanciful, or distinctive way.”); 2 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:26 (4th ed. 2015) (“The
combination of two or more admittedly descriptive elements as a composite mark may result
in a composite which is nondescriptive.”).
24. See Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253, 1254 (2011). 
25. Jeanne Fromer and Mark Lemley speak of IP regimes as requiring some combination
2208 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:2197
example, prohibits others from making, using, offering to sell, or
selling the patented invention within the United States, or im-
porting the invention into the United States.26 That formulation
requires both a determination that the defendant is engaged in
certain acts—the making, using, selling, and so on—and a determi-
nation that the defendant is engaging in those prohibited acts with
“the patented invention,” or, in the case of design patent, the
“patented design.” Thus, a party that makes the patented invention
outside the United States (and does not import it) does not infringe.
Nor does a party that sells within the United States an invention
that does not read on each element of the claimed invention. 
Similarly, copyright requires a determination that the defendant
has reproduced, distributed to the public, publicly displayed, or pub-
licly performed, “the copyrighted work,” or that it has created a
derivative of that copyrighted work.27 A party that privately per-
forms the copyrighted work does not infringe. Nor does a party
that publicly performs something that is not the copyrighted work.
Trademark law requires that the defendant make commercial use
of the plaintiff ’s mark in a way that is likely to cause confusion or
to dilute a famous mark.28 A party that does not make commercial
use does not infringe, even if whatever use it made was likely to
cause confusion. Likewise a party that makes commercial use of a
mark does not infringe if that mark is too dissimilar or is used in a
context that makes confusion and dilution unlikely. 
Together the prohibited acts and the requisite similarity deter-
mine the legal scope of a party’s rights.29 But of course that legal
scope is inextricably intertwined with the delineation of the entitle-
ment we previously described. For when we say that the defendant
must publicly perform “the copyrighted work,” we take for granted
that we have already been able to define “the copyrighted work” so
that we can anchor our analysis of similarity in relation to that
of “technical similarity” and “market substitution.” Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The
Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (2014).
26. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
28. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2012). 
29. To be more precise, they determine some dimensions of legal scope. A variety of other
considerations come into play to fully delineate legal scope—the duration of rights and their
geographic scope, for example. 
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work. Further, we generally mean that the defendant must have
taken the thing that gives the IP right its validity—the point of nov-
elty, in patent terms. The marks “Shake Shack” and “Joe’s Crab
Shack” might share the word “shack,” but that fact alone shouldn’t
cause the newcomer to be guilty of trademark infringement, for the
simple reason that the word “shack” alone is not what justifies
protecting the trademark. Nor does the fact that our title includes
the word “scope” give a mouthwash company the right to sue us for
trademark infringement.30 Similarly, your novel might share with
our Article the word “the,” but copying that word from us doesn’t
make you a copyright infringer, because the originality of our Article
does not result from our use of the word “the” by itself.
Determination of the scope of a party’s rights therefore necessar-
ily depends on a definition of the relevant IP. More particularly,
evaluating whether the defendant’s use comes within the legal scope
of the plaintiff ’s rights requires identification of the protectable ele-
ments of those rights, because all of the IP regimes require, at least
in theory, not just similarity between the defendant’s and plaintiff’s
works, but similarity with respect to the protectable elements. 
Our primary focus here is on the question of how courts manage
scope in this respect—how they determine the protectable elements
of a work and ensure that infringement analysis in fact focuses on
those protectable elements. But of course we recognize that this is
only one part of the scope story. 
Legal scope is also determined in part by various defenses. For
one thing, some doctrines, even though formally classified as defen-
ses, really go to the question of validity. Certain issues, for example,
are only formally designated defenses because the IP at issue is
registered and therefore benefits from a presumption of validity,
putting the burden on the defendant with respect to that issue.
30. These examples sound ridiculous. But it is surprisingly common for trademark owners
to assert claims against marks that resemble their own only in relation to obviously
unprotectable elements. See, e.g., M.Z. Berger & Co. v. Swatch AG, 787 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (considering allegation that “iWatch” for watches was too similar to “Swatch”);
Complaint, Ky. Mist Moonshine v. Univ. of Ky., No. 5:15-cv-00328-JMH (E.D. Ky. Nov. 2,
2015) (challenging allegation that “Kentucky Mist Moonshine” for whisky was too similar to
the University of Kentucky’s registration of “Kentucky” for educational and sports services);
Complaint, Star of Tx. Fair & Rodeo v. El Rodeo Inc., No. 1:15-cv-00992 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 2,
2015) (alleging that “El Rodeo” for a restaurant was too similar to “Rodeo Austin” for a rodeo).
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Distinctiveness for registered trademarks is presumed, so a defen-
dant that claimed the asserted mark lacked distinctiveness would
have to raise that as an affirmative defense and would bear the
burden of proof on that issue.31 Invalidity in a patent case similarly
must be raised by the defendant as a defense.32 Because these kinds
of defenses really relate to validity, they tend to be all-or-nothing,
meaning that these defenses generally go to the existence of rights
at all, rather than simply excusing the particular defendant’s
conduct.33 Classifying these doctrines as defenses matters, however,
because it affects the allocation of the burden of proof and how
heavy that burden will be.34 Invalidity in patent cases, for example,
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.35 Still, defenses of
this type require decisions about whether the IP rights should exist
at all.
Other defenses are more like excuses in that they don’t deny the
existence of valid rights but offer some reason why those rights do
not reach this particular defendant under the circumstances. In
copyright law, the statutory exemption for using protected works in
face-to-face classroom teaching does not alter the copyright owner’s
rights vis-à-vis any other use, even other educational uses, which
usually must be adjudicated under the less specific standards of fair
use.36 
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a). 
32. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
33. There are some exceptions here, particularly in trademark law, which allows unfair
competition remedies in very limited situations even when a mark has been found generic.
See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116, 122-23 (1938); Blinded Veterans
Ass’n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1989); King-Seeley
Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963). The injunctions in these
cases are quite narrow, and they specifically cannot prevent competitors from using the
generic terms altogether. See Blinded Veterans, 872 F.2d at 1043 (“[T]he subsequent compet-
itor cannot be prevented from using the generic term to denote itself or its product, but it may
be enjoined from passing itself or its product off as the first organization or its product. Thus,
a court may require the competitor to take whatever steps are necessary to distinguish itself
or its product from the first organization or its product.”).
34. Calling something a defense may also affect who decides—though as we note below,
the allocation of decisionmaking responsibility is surprisingly unclear in some of the contexts
with which we’re concerned.
35. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011).
36. See 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2012). And, of course, despite its more general standards, fair use
itself focuses on the legitimacy of the specific defendant’s use rather than denying the exis-
tence of any rights.
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These different types of defenses exist in varying proportion in
different IP regimes. Utility patent law has many of the former type
of defenses because patent requires defendants to prove invalidity
and unenforceability, but it has virtually none of the latter type,
save for the extremely narrow experimental use defense.37 Design
patent is mostly the same, though there is some ambiguity about
the role of functionality in infringement.38 Copyright has relatively
few general defenses because its threshold for validity is so low,
though as we discuss below, some courts regard certain aspects of
validity (like merger) as defenses. On the other hand, copyright is
chock full of specific exceptions and defenses that protect particular
users in particular situations.39 And even cases that seem from some
vantage point to be concerned with validity look that way only be-
cause of the nature of the defendant’s use—which is to say that they
might really be defendant-specific scope decisions after all.
Take the famous case of Baker v. Selden, which is widely regarded
as the source of copyright’s idea-expression doctrine.40 According to
the Court, Selden’s attempt to enforce rights against Baker for the
latter’s use of accounting forms that were substantially similar to
those illustrated in Selden’s book amounted to an illegitimate at-
tempt to use copyright to prevent use of an unpatented method of
accounting.41 As the Court noted, “the mere copyright of Selden’s
book did not confer upon him the exclusive right to make and use
account-books, ruled and arranged as designated by him and de-
scribed and illustrated in said book.”42
Because the Court’s opinion speaks in terms of protectability, it
is natural to see the case in terms of validity.43 But Selden’s forms
37. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding the exper-
imental use defense inapplicable in virtually all circumstances). More recently, the America
Invents Act expanded a prior user right defense somewhat, 35 U.S.C. § 273, but that defense
has so far not been applied in a reported decision.
38. See Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1293-94 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
39. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122.
40. See 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879).
41. See id. at 105 (“The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of
copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The object of the one is
explanation; the object of the other is use. The former may be secured by copyright. The latter
can only be secured, if it can be secured at all, by letters-patent.”). 
42. Id. at 107. 
43. See id. (“The conclusion to which we have come is, that blank account-books are not
the subject of copyright.”).
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were included in a book that clearly was the subject of copyright,
and the question for the Court was whether Baker’s creation of
similar account books infringed the copyright in Selden’s book.44 To
put it in our terms, the issue was the scope of Selden’s rights in his
book. And the Court determined that those rights didn’t allow
Selden to prevent use of the forms for the purpose of practicing the
art45—itself a controversial conclusion at the time.46 That wasn’t
the end of the story, however, as the Court strongly implied that
other uses of the forms might have fallen within Selden’s rights. As
the Court said: 
[W]here the art [the book] teaches cannot be used without
employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book,
or such as are similar to them, such methods and diagrams are
to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given
therewith to the public; not given for the purpose of publication
in other works explanatory of the art, but for the purpose of prac-
tical application.47
Baker v. Selden, then, isn’t really a validity case or an infringement
case. It is about the proper scope of a valid copyright.
A number of other famous copyright cases also are really about
the scope of rights. In Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Inter-
national, Inc., for instance, the district court held that Borland
infringed Lotus’s copyright in its spreadsheet program by copying
the menu commands that activated features in the Lotus program
so that Borland users could port their spreadsheets over from Lotus
and use familiar command keys.48 For the district court, Lotus had
a valid copyright in its program (surely true), so the only question
44. See id. at 99-100.
45. See id. at 103 (“The copyright of a book on perspective, no matter how many drawings
and illustrations it may contain, gives no exclusive right to the modes of drawing described,
though they may never have been known or used before. By publishing the book, without get-
ting a patent for the art, the latter is given to the public.”).
46. For a general discussion of the history and context of the case, see Pamela Samuelson,
The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between Authorship and Invention,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 159 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds.,
2006).
47. Baker, 101 U.S. at 103 (emphasis added).
48. See 49 F.3d 807, 812 (1st Cir. 1995).
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was one of infringement.49 The court of appeals reversed. In the
majority’s view, the key question was validity, but it determined
that the lawful scope of Lotus’s copyright did not extend to menu
commands because they were unprotectable methods of operation.50
The concurrence, by contrast, would have treated the menu com-
mands as part of the valid copyright but would have treated
Borland’s use of those commands for compatibility purposes as a
privileged use.51 The difference in approach is a function of scope,
and the consequences differ significantly. A validity approach bars
all protection for the work in question (though note that even here
the Lotus majority engaged in a scope inquiry by focusing only on
the protectability of a particular part of the program, while the dis-
trict court focused on the program as a whole), whereas a fair use
defense privileges some but not all uses of that work, leaving others
as infringing. Other copyright cases, particularly those involving
software, produce similar debates about the proper approach.52
Trademark is the most hybrid of the regimes. Some defenses—
including genericness, abandonment, and functionality (at least
mechanical functionality)—are really validity doctrines with all-or-
nothing effect. Other doctrines, like descriptive fair use and the first
sale doctrine, are defendant-specific.53 Still other doctrines—Rogers
49. See id. at 811.
50. See id. at 816. For a defense of this ruling pointing out that 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) ex-
cludes much more than ideas from copyright protection, see Pamela Samuelson, Why
Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1921, 1921-23 (2007).
51. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 821-22 (Boudin, J., concurring). 
52. See, e.g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Am.
Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 1997). In Oracle, the
district court held that Oracle’s Java applications program interfaces (APIs)—bits of code
designed to allow other programs to interact with Java—were unprotectable methods of
operation that Google was free to copy. See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1347-48. The Federal Circuit
reversed, holding that the APIs were independently protectable and that copying them was
infringement, but leaving open the question of whether doing so was a fair use. See id. at
1348.
53. As one of us has previously emphasized, trademark law is plagued with uncertainty
about the extent to which various defensive doctrines are really defenses in the sense that
they are distinct from the prima facie case of infringement. See William McGeveran & Mark
P. McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 277 (2013). That
uncertainty has significant consequences for scope, in that it is often unclear whether the
“defenses” are doing any work to limit scope or instead are simply describing situations under
which confusion is unlikely and therefore noninfringing. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex
Stein, Intellectual Property Defenses, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1483, 1503-04 (2013) (asserting that
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v. Grimaldi and related expressive use doctrines, for example—are
defendant-specific but perhaps not really defenses as much as ex-
pressions of what falls outside the scope of a trademark owner’s
prima facie legal rights.54
B. Why Scope Matters Now
Doctrines of infringement, validity, and defenses have been
around almost as long as IP law.55 Why, then, has the issue of scope
become important now? Three developments in IP law over the
course of the twentieth century explain why scope is a much more
important issue today than it was in the past. First, most areas of
IP have loosened their infringement standards. In copyright, for
example, not only did the law recognize new exclusive rights, but
courts watered down the level of similarity necessary for a defen-
dant’s work to be deemed infringing. Whereas once a defendant’s
work had to be highly similar to the plaintiff ’s work as a whole,
courts now find infringement based on the similarity of the defen-
dant’s work to small parts of the plaintiff ’s work,56 and even the
similarity of small parts of the defendant’s work to small parts of
the plaintiff ’s work.57 Overall similarity is no longer necessary;
fragmented similarity is enough.58
“defenses play an important role in delineating the scope of protection that our law affords
to trademarks”). For a full discussion of copyright “limitations and exceptions” that spans both
true defenses and limitations that are nonetheless part of the prima facie case of copyright
infringement, see Pamela Samuelson, Justifications for Copyright Limitations & Exceptions,
in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS (Ruth Okediji ed., forthcoming
2016) (manuscript at 1-4), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2476669 [https://perma.cc/NX82-T9PM].
54. Under Rogers v. Grimaldi, which now seems to be the dominant approach to expres-
sive-use cases, use of a mark in or in relation to an expressive work is not infringing so long
as it has some artistic relevance to the work and does not explicitly mislead. 875 F.2d 994,
1005 (2d Cir. 1989). This is clearly a scope doctrine, but—to our point about the superficiality
of these categories—probably more a question of infringement than defense. 
55. Though, as we note below, modern courts conceive of the distinctions between these
phases much more rigidly than their predecessors.
56. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985).
57. The music sampling cases are the most extreme examples here. See Bridgeport Music,
Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 799-805 (6th Cir. 2005). But the phenomenon is not
limited to sound recordings. See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1347-48; ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Har-
risongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 997 (2d Cir. 1983).
58. See Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
575, 618 (2005).
2016] SCOPE 2215
It’s possible to see this evolution in terms of how to define the
work with which the defendant’s work should be compared rather
than as a watering down of the similarity standard. Instead of de-
fining works in terms of the tangible artifacts in which expression
was fixed (for instance, a book, a song, or a motion picture), copy-
right law now conceives of the unit of protection in terms of
originality. As a result, rather than conceiving of the plaintiff ’s work
as an entire book or song, as they once would have, courts now are
willing to look inside the plaintiff ’s work for small increments of
original expression. As Justin Hughes persuasively described, this
was the predictable result of copyright’s de-emphasis of registration
and abstraction away from tangible objects to intangible “works” as
the unit of protection.59 Until registration was eliminated as a re-
quirement for copyright protection, “the system largely policed itself
in terms of the size and concept of ‘works’ which creators and
owners deemed worthy of protection.”60 But as the uproar over the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Garcia v. Google, Inc. demonstrates,
when only originality delineates a copyrighted work, courts have
little meaningful guidance on how to draw the boundaries of an
“original work of authorship.”61
Whether we see the development of copyright’s infringement
standard as a lessening of the similarity standard or an increasing
willingness to define works granularly, the point is that much
smaller bits of similarity are enough to trigger liability. And that
puts much more pressure on the infringement apparatus to ensure
that the similarity relates to protectable matter.
Trademark law experienced something similar. In the early part
of the twentieth century, trademark infringement and unfair compe-
tition, while doctrinally distinct, were both concerned with the same
wrong of trade diversion.62 As a result, only directly competing uses
were actionable, as those are the only uses that could result in pas-
sing off (selling the defendant’s goods as if they were the plaintiff ’s
59. Id. at 580; see also Paul Goldstein, What Is a Copyrighted Work? Why Does It Matter?,
58 UCLA L. REV. 1175, 1178 (2011); Madison, supra note 20, at 2-3. 
60. Hughes, supra note 58, at 580.
61. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that actress had a
“copyright interest” in her performance within a film), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 733, 749-50 (9th
Cir. 2015) (rejecting plaintiff ’s claim that her performance was copyrightable work).
62. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1839, 1849 (2007).
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goods). But courts dramatically expanded the range of actionable
confusion over the course of the twentieth century. No longer was it
necessary for consumers to believe that the defendant’s goods were
those of the plaintiff, or even that the plaintiff actually produced
those goods. Instead, it was enough that consumers believed there
was some relationship between the plaintiff and defendant—that
the plaintiff “sponsored” the defendant or was somehow “affiliated”
with it.63
Whatever the merits of this expansion, it naturally reduced the
level of similarity necessary to find infringement. When courts
sought only to prevent trade diversion, they were concerned only
with uses of a mark for directly competing goods. Infringement
analysis therefore consisted simply of a comparison of the parties’
respective marks; no likelihood of confusion factors were neces-
sary.64 And since the comparison of the marks was meant only to
determine whether consumers were likely to believe that the de-
fendant’s goods were the plaintiff ’s goods, only highly similar uses
could be found infringing.65 Once courts could find infringement by
concluding only that consumers might believe there was some con-
nection between the parties, less similarity between the marks
themselves was necessary.66 For the same reason, the goods marked
no longer needed to be the same.67
63. We have previously written on the problems with overbroad notions of “sponsorship”
or “affiliation.” See Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV.
413, 427 (2010).
64. See McKenna, supra note 62, at 1904 (noting that courts only developed the likelihood
of confusion factors after jettisoning the requirement of direct competition). For a more
thorough account of the development of the likelihood of confusion factors, see Robert G. Bone,
Taking the Confusion out of “Likelihood of Confusion”: Toward a More Sensible Approach to
Trademark Infringement, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1316-36 (2012).
65. Unfair competition cases obviously didn’t involve comparison of trademarks, since by
definition they didn’t involve technical trademarks. But the same general point held in those
cases. Unfair competition required a finding that, despite not using a trademark, the defen-
dant’s acts were likely to deceive consumers into thinking that the defendant’s goods were
those of the plaintiff. And that finding required use of something highly similar to what the
plaintiff was using—whether use of a similar trade name, geographic term, or product pack-
aging—in a way that was likely to deceive.
66. Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Looking at the Lanham Act: Images in Trademark and Adver-
tising Law, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 861, 888-89 (“If the question were only ‘when you look at X, do
you think it is Y?’ then it would be much easier to avoid defining X. With the question ‘when
you look at X, do you associate it with Y?’ there is a greater premium on knowing exactly what
X is—how far something can deviate from X before it no longer reminds consumers of X.”).
67. For a discussion, see Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109
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Loosening of the infringement standard in design patent is more
recent, and possibly less consistent, but we think equally notable.
The basic rule of infringement has been the same since Gorham Co.
v. White, under which a design patent is infringed “if, in the eye of
an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually
gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is
such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one
supposing it to be the other.”68 While this standard has never re-
quired absolute identity, as the finding of infringement in Gorham
itself indicates, for most of their history, design patents were re-
garded as extremely narrow. Indeed, Judge Rich once famously
wrote that “[d]esign patents have almost no scope.”69 To whatever
extent Judge Rich was right at the time he wrote, it is much harder
to describe design patents the same way today.
Second, this relaxation of the infringement standards happened
at the same time courts and Congress were significantly expanding
the subject matter of nearly every area of IP. We mean this both
in the sense that IP regimes included new types of protectable sub-
ject matter (in copyright, software, sound recordings, architectural
works, to name a few), and also in the sense that new technologies
operated on existing subject matter categories to effectively create
new subject matter (for example, software patents, or design patents
on graphical user interfaces). In trademark law this subject matter
expansion has been particularly dramatic. Whereas only technical
trademarks were previously eligible for registration and enforce-
ment under federal law, modern law recognizes “anything ... capable
of carrying [source] meaning” as a potential trademark.70 
MICH. L. REV. 137, 146-56 (2010). 
68. 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871).
69. In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In fact, precisely because they
perceived design patents to have no scope, many commentators who were interested in
broader protection for design focused on expanded copyright protection as a solution. See, e.g.,
Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1356 (1987) (calling
design patent “a Cinderella who never goes to the ball”); J.H. Reichman, Design Protection
After the Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative View of the Emerging Interim Models, 31 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 267, 350 & n.475 (1983) (calling the failure to achieve comprehensive short-
term protection for the design of useful articles a “mutilation” that left copyright with the
separability test and no effective protection for the designs excluded from copyright as a
result).
70. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
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This has collapsed unfair competition entirely into trademark
law, bringing into trademark law subject matter that once would
have been subject only to unfair competition enforcement. As a re-
sult, trademark infringement questions now often involve much
more complex comparisons. Rather than simple comparisons of
word marks or logos, cases now regularly involve comparisons of ad-
vertising slogans, product packaging, and even the product designs
themselves. And though even comparisons of word marks present
scope issues, the difficulty of those questions is compounded with
more complex marks because those marks are likely to include
much more unprotectable matter. 
Combining these developments, we can see why the kind of scope
questions with which we are concerned are much more pressing
now. If courts require a very high level of similarity to find infringe-
ment, they can afford to be less worried about the extent to which
the similarity between the works is due to unprotectable elements.
To take a highly stylized example, if, in order to find infringement,
a court must find the defendant’s work, trademark, or design 90
percent similar to the plaintiff ’s, then it can be less concerned about
the fact that 75 percent of the plaintiff ’s work is unprotectable. In
order to reach the 90 percent similarity threshold, the defendant
will necessarily have copied protectable matter. If, on the other
hand, the defendant’s work must only be 65 percent similar to be
deemed infringing, then it is a serious concern if 75 percent of the
plaintiff ’s work is unprotectable, because the 65 percent threshold
could easily be met entirely by similarity to unprotectable matter.
Most areas of IP put pressure on both sides of this equation over
the twentieth century—lowering the level of similarity necessary to
find infringement and protecting works with higher proportions of
unprotectable elements. To manage the resulting problems, courts
in each area of IP have developed elaborate doctrinal structures for
evaluating validity and infringement. These doctrines are supposed
to limit the scope of a right to correspond to the point of novelty,
originality, or other elements of protectibility. And they stand in
some contrast to their historical predecessors. Patent, design patent,
and trademark law all paid much less attention to the validity-
infringement distinction in the nineteenth century than they do
today. Cases tended to be resolved by concluding that the defendant
was or was not liable, rather than separating the decision into
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validity and infringement grounds.71 In part, that was because
invalidation of a patent did not have the same consequence it has
today: eliminating the plaintiff ’s right to sue anyone else for in-
fringement.72 We only needed a way to assess scope once we
separated validity from infringement clearly and began applying
different standards to each.
But the development of these safeguards has run into conflict
with the third development in the twentieth century—the increas-
ing role of juries in resolving infringement and validity disputes.
Jury trials expanded dramatically in patent cases, from less than
2.5 percent of all trials in the middle of the twentieth century to
nearly 70 percent by its end.73 Courts in the mid-twentieth century
expanded the role of the jury and its ordinary observer standard in
assessing copyright infringement.74 Complex rules for deciding the
proper scope of an IP right are difficult things to convey to the jury. 
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH SEPARATION
A. Gaps in the Fabric of IP Scope
Notwithstanding the interconnectedness of the various scope
questions courts must address, those questions arise in different
parts of the tripartite case structure typically associated with IP
cases. The result of this separation between validity, infringement,
and defenses is a number of disconnects—gaps in the IP regime
through which either an IP owner or an infringer can sneak. By
gaps, we mean circumstances in which the law should reach a
consistent scope result but fails to do so because each IP doctrine
assumes that others will take care of the problem. 
71. See Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674, 682 (1892).
72. See Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673,
1682 (2013) (discussing this change). 
73. For a discussion of this history, see id. at 1704-06. 
74. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
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B. Gaps Exist in the Fabric of IP for a Number of Reasons
1. Different Decisionmakers
Sometimes different actors decide different doctrines, often at
different times. Some IP issues are decided by judges, others by
juries.75 Judges and juries can have fundamentally different ap-
proaches to similar questions.76 When a judge resolves one issue
(say, granting summary judgment that a patent is infringed) and
declines to resolve others (whether the patent is invalid) on the
assumption that the jury will handle the latter issue, the fact that
the jury rather than the judge makes the second determination
leaves open the possibility that the two issues will not be resolved
consistently. That is even more likely when the jury hears only part
of the story because the judge has already decided other parts. In
our example, a jury that might be inclined to decide that a plaintiff’s
patent shouldn’t cover the defendant’s conduct doesn’t have an
opportunity to do so because the judge has already resolved the
infringement issue. The jury will hear only the all-or-nothing
question of whether the patent is invalid without learning of the
dispute over how broadly it is being construed. As we noted in the
last section, this is a bigger problem now than it was in the past, not
only because the division between infringement and validity is
sharper, but also because juries play more of a role in assessing
validity than they used to.
For many IP regimes, the problem of different decisionmakers is
heightened by the fact that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) is set up to resolve some IP issues—specifically, validity
questions—but not others. Thus, the PTO decides the validity of the
patents and trademarks it considers, initially or in reexamination,
75. For a discussion on the division between judge and jury in patent cases, along with
some skepticism as to whether juries are required to decide many of these issues, see Eileen
M. Herlihy, The Ripple Effect of Seventh Amendment Decisions on the Development of
Substantive Patent Law, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 333, 343 (2011). See
generally Lemley, supra note 72. For consideration of a thorny issue on the allocation of de-
cisionmaking in trademark cases, see generally Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907
(2015) (holding that continuing commercial impression, the standard for tacking, is a fact
question which generally should be decided by a jury).
76. See generally Fromer & Lemley, supra note 25 (describing the differences between an
expert and a consumer analysis).
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without having to confront the scope of the resulting right, or con-
sidering who might be sued for infringing it and whether she might
have a defense to suit.77 Indeed, the PTO even applies different sub-
stantive standards than the courts on important issues like claim
construction in patent law78 and likelihood of confusion in trade-
mark law.79
In patent law, that structural disconnect has recently become
more pronounced. Whereas the PTO considers only validity issues
when deciding to issue a patent, courts traditionally have consid-
ered both validity and infringement issues when the patent is
enforced. Beginning in 1980, however, the PTO got limited power to
reexamine its earlier decision to issue a patent.80 Those powers were
expanded dramatically in 2011 by the America Invents Act, which
gave the PTO the power to conduct inter partes review,81 postgrant
oppositions,82 and covered business method reviews.83 Patent chal-
lengers have instituted thousands of such reviews since 2011.84 And
for one of these proceedings, covered business method review, courts
are generally expected to stay litigation proceedings until the PTO
review process is complete.85 The result is that a growing number of
77. See generally Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609 (2012) (discuss-
ing the powers of the PTO).
78. While courts seek to determine the proper meaning of a term to a person of ordinary
skill in the art, the PTO applies the “broadest reasonable construction” of a term, not only
when granting patents in the first instance but even when reexamining issued patents that
are also pending in litigation. See generally Dawn-Marie Bey & Christopher A. Cotropia, The
Unreasonableness of the Patent Office’s “Broadest Reasonable Interpretation” Standard, 37
AIPLA Q.J. 285 (2009) (discussing and criticizing this difference).
79. The PTO evaluates likelihood of confusion considering only the similarity of the marks
as depicted, not taking into account the context in which the mark is used. See 3 MCCARTHY,
supra note 23, § 20:15 (“In determining likelihood of confusion in an opposition, it is the mark
as shown in the application and as used on the goods described in the application which must
be considered, not the mark as actually used by applicant.”). The difference between PTO and
judicial likelihood of confusion standards is the subject of a recent Supreme Court case. See
B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015).
80. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-304 (2012).
81. See id. § 311.
82. See id. § 321.
83. See id. note (b)(2) (Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents).
84. Office of Patent Legal Admin., AIA Statistics, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Mar. 27,
2015), http://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/america-invents-act-aia/aia-statistics
[https://perma.cc/SCL8-ZTWE].
85. See 35 U.S.C. § 321 note (b)(2) (Transitional Program for Covered Business Method
Patents); VirtualAgility Inc. v. Salesforce.com, 759 F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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patent cases will be resolved by considering the question of validity
in the abstract, without infringement and defenses being presented
to the PTO.86 While there is some risk the PTO will wrongly invali-
date a patent claim that should properly have been narrowed, there
is also a risk that it will hold a patent claim valid without consider-
ing the breadth of that claim, and that such a decision will influence
district courts in subsequent litigation where the breadth question
is actually presented.87
2. Different Burdens of Proof
Even if the decisionmaker is the same, validity, infringement, and
defenses often come with different burdens of proof. For example,
registered IP rights are all presumed valid when challenged in
court; the standard of proof differs from a preponderance of the
evidence in copyright and trademark cases to clear and convincing
evidence in patent and design patent cases. Proving infringement
is the IP owner’s burden, always by preponderance of the evidence;
proving a defense is a defendant’s burden, and again the level of
proof required may differ by doctrine and defense.88 
86. On the uneven growth of the administrative powers of the PTO over patent law, see,
for example, Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547 (2011);
Jacob S. Sherkow, Administrating Patent Litigation, 90 WASH. L. REV. 205, 218-19 (2015);
Sarah Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 831,
855-58 (2012); Tran, supra note 77, at 609, 626-30.
The problem is even worse in Europe, where the infringement and validity decisions are
fully separated, with a court deciding infringement and the patent agencies deciding validity.
That has led to a number of cases in which courts grant injunctions on the basis of patents
that are later determined to be invalid. See generally Katrin Cremers et al., Invalid but In-
fringed? An Analysis of Germany’s Bifurcated Patent Litigation System (Max Planck Inst. for
Innovation and Competition Research Paper Series, Paper No. 14-14, 2015), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2504507 [https://perma.cc/JV55-FWNN] (discussing instances of patents found in-
valid after a determination of infringement).
87. Courts seem increasingly willing to defer to decisions of administrative courts in the
PTO. See, e.g., B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015)
(holding that rulings of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board on likelihood of confusion
collaterally estopped litigating parties in courts).
88. Inequitable conduct in patent law, for instance, requires proof by the defendant by
clear and convincing evidence. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276,
1287 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). Most other defenses require a defendant to show only a
preponderance of the evidence. See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringe-
ment, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 103 (2013).
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Even the same doctrine may require different standards of proof
for different parties and at different times. Patent invalidity must
be proven by clear and convincing evidence in court, but only by a
preponderance of the evidence during patent examination or during
some—but not all—forms of reexamination in the PTO.89 The fact
that someone is the first inventor of a patent must be proved in an
interference proceeding by a preponderance of the evidence if the
patent has not yet issued or been published, but by clear and
convincing evidence if the challenge is raised thereafter.90 The
Supreme Court cemented this distinction in Commil USA, LLC v.
Cisco Systems, Inc., declaring that “[v]alidity and infringement are
distinct issues, bearing different burdens, different presumptions,
and different evidence.”91
The fact that different parts of the IP fabric are subject to
different standards of proof leaves open the possibility that those
burdens will distort the overall result in the case. If there is a
preponderance of the evidence supporting a patent defendant, but
not clear and convincing evidence, whether we treat the evidence as
relevant to validity or to infringement will determine who wins the
case. Similarly, when evidence is hard to come by, classifying a
doctrine as part of infringement (which the plaintiff must prove) or
a defense (which the defendant must prove) will determine the out-
come. Further, as Jonathan Masur and Lisa Ouellette have shown,
the difference in deference regimes can lead to systematic mistakes
in applying the law from one context to another.92
89. See, e.g., In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
90. See Bruning v. Hirose, 161 F.3d 681, 684-86 (Fed. Cir. 1998). No challenge at all can
be made more than a year after the patent is issued or the application is published. 35 U.S.C.
§ 135(a)(2) (2012) (abrogated prospectively by the America Invents Act of 2011). 
91. 135 S.Ct. 1920, 1929 (2015) (quoting Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d
1361, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). For an argument that this separation in patent law owes its
origin to the pre-Federal Circuit separation of validity and infringement determinations into
different courts, see Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law: The Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
843, 874-83 (2010).
92. See generally Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82
U. CHI. L. REV. 643 (2015) (discussing consequences of deference mistakes).
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3. A Reluctance to Invalidate IP Rights 
Courts, and particularly juries, are reluctant to second-guess the
PTO and declare IP rights invalid altogether. Roger Ford has ar-
gued that courts are accordingly too willing to resolve cases on
infringement grounds even when the IP right should, in truth, be
invalid.93 In fact, however, this reluctance often makes sense, not so
much because the PTO has the final say, but because many times
an IP right is properly valid but narrow. But a low threshold for
validity only makes sense if we have confidence that we can sort out
efforts to overclaim the scope of that right using infringement
doctrines. And often we don’t have the proper tools in infringement
or defenses. When validity and infringement are separated, the
reluctance of courts to invalidate an IP right altogether means that
they find it hard to reach the right result when the tools for limiting
the right are classed as invalidity or general defenses rather than
infringement doctrines or conduct-specific defenses. This is true of
the functionality doctrine in both trademark and design patents, for
instance. Because we don’t have a clear defense for nontrademark
uses94—uses of a mark by a defendant, not for purposes of signaling
source, but to take advantage of the intrinsic characteristics of the
product—courts are often faced with a choice between invalidating
a mark altogether or letting the plaintiff get away with expanding
the scope of her right beyond its proper bounds.95 Courts in this sit-
uation tend to expand the right rather than invalidate it,96 though
93. See generally Ford, supra note 88.
94. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009), is generally considered
responsible for effectively killing the trademark use doctrine, though it remains good law in
several circuits. For discussion of the state of the doctrine and its merits, compare Stacey L.
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L.
REV. 1669, 1670 (2007) (defending the importance of the doctrine), with Graeme B. Dinwoodie
& Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV.
1597, 1599-603 (2007) (arguing that there should be no limitation on the sort of conduct that
could infringe trademarks, if found to confuse consumers), and Mark P. McKenna, Trademark
Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 774-76 (challenging the ability of
courts to define what constitutes a trademark use).
95. Cf. Chao, supra note 8, at 1359 (“Although there are numerous existing doctrines that
try to prevent claims from straying too far from their specification, these doctrines offer
binary outcomes ill suited for patent law.”).
96. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 162 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that
the functionality doctrine applies only to the mark as used by the plaintiff and not to the
defendant’s use of the mark); Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d
2016] SCOPE 2225
sometimes they have made up new defenses or other doctrines to try
to avoid the choice.97 
4. Strategic Behavior
Each of the problems we just identified exists even if no one tries
to exploit these gaps. They are inherent disconnects between the
rules of validity, infringement, and defenses. But in fact parties
inevitably seek to exploit them for their own advantage. Parties can
exploit the gaps in a variety of ways. One of the simplest is trying
to separate the determination of validity from the determination of
infringement, either by having them done at separate times or by
different decisionmakers. Whenever the two are separated, IP
owners will argue in the infringement proceedings that their right
is quite broad, covering what the defendant does, only to turn
around and argue in validity proceedings that their right is quite
narrow and therefore valid. Accused infringers will do the reverse.
Without a single integrated scope proceeding, there is no easy way
to constrain this behavior.
C. IP Doctrines and the Nose of Wax
The result of these gaps has been that every IP regime has
instances in which courts systematically reach the wrong decisions
on the scope of the right. In this Section, we offer a few examples
from each regime.
1062, 1072-74 (9th Cir. 2006) (refusing to apply the aesthetic functionality doctrine to the
defendant’s use of the marks for fear of invalidating those marks).
97. In Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent American Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d
206 (2d Cir. 2012), for instance, the court evaded the aesthetic functionality doctrine and
limited Louboutin’s rights to contrasting red-sole shoes so as to find for the defendant but
avoid invalidating the mark altogether or even explicitly deciding whether consumers were
confused. See id. at 212. And several courts have sought to apply a doctrine of “defensive
functionality” to protect the defendant’s use from liability without invalidating the mark
altogether, though those efforts have ultimately been rejected. See, e.g., Rosetta Stone Ltd.
v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2010), rev’d in relevant part, 676 F.3d 144, 161
(4th Cir. 2012); Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011),
rev’d on reh’g, 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011). One of us has previously argued that those courts
were on the right track. Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823, 854-57
(2011).
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1. Copyright
Copyright law is the least reliant of the IP regimes on validity
doctrines and therefore the most reliant on infringement doctrines
and defenses to manage the scope of a party’s rights. Copyright’s
originality threshold requires only independent creation and a
minimal level of creativity.98 As the Supreme Court said in Feist
Publications v. Rural Telephone Service, “the requisite level of crea-
tivity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast
majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some
creative spark, no matter how crude, humble or obvious it might
be.”99 Copyright thus allows protection for works that are extreme-
ly similar to works in the public domain or other copyrightable
works,100 or that incorporate many unprotectable elements.
Copyright tries to deal with this fact through a number of doc-
trines that limit the scope of protection. Copyright does not extend
to facts or ideas,101 and while copyright can subsist in the selection
and arrangement of facts or ideas, courts will deny protection in
cases in which idea and expression merge because there are few
ways to express an idea.102 Copyright also does not extend to
“scènes-à-faire”—stock scenes that naturally flow from a common
theme.103 Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act is in some senses a
98. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“Original, as
the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal
degree of creativity.”).
99. Id. (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08
[c][1] (1990)).
100. Indeed, in principle a work is protectable even if it is identical to prior works, so long
as the work was independently created. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d
49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (“Borrowed the work must indeed not be, for a plagiarist is not himself
pro tanto an ‘author’; but if by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose
anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if he copyrighted it, others
might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats’s.”).
101. Feist, 499 U.S. at 344-45. 
102. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967)
(finding Morrissey’s rules for a promotional contest uncopyrightable on merger grounds).
103. See, e.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding no
protection for common elements in police fiction, such as “drunks, prostitutes, vermin and
derelict cars” and “[f]oot chases and the morale problems of policemen, not to mention the
familiar figure of the Irish cop”); Evans v. Wallace Berrie & Co., 681 F. Supp. 813, 817 (S.D.
Fla. 1988) (“Such similarities as using a sand dollar as currency, foods made of seaweed,
seahorses for transportation and plates made of oyster or mother of pearl are not protected
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codification of the idea/expression dichotomy, but that section goes
further and excludes protection for processes, systems, and methods
of operation.104
These are important doctrines that sometimes operate at the
validity stage to preclude protection under any circumstances.105 In
Feist, for example, the Court found Rural Telephone’s white pages
uncopyrightable because the names, towns, and telephone numbers
were unprotectable facts, and Rural had not selected or arranged
those facts in an original way.106 As a result, Feist’s white pages
could not infringe, even though Feist had actually copied a number
of listings from Rural’s phone book.107 And in Morrissey v. Procter &
Gamble, the court refused protection to Morrissey’s sweepstakes
rules on merger grounds even though it found that “there was more
than one way of expressing” the rules for the game, and that there
was “almost precise similarity” between the plaintiff ’s and the
defendant’s rules.108
But, in general, copyright law only rarely disqualifies works
altogether and instead generally relies on infringement doctrine to
limit the scope of rights in a work so that it reflects that work’s mar-
ginal copyrightability. Indeed, even the doctrines we just identified
often don’t fit neatly in the validity box. Courts most commonly
recite these restrictions not to deny the plaintiff protection at all,
similarities of expression, but are more accurately characterizations that naturally follow
from the common theme of an underwater civilization.”).
104. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); see Samuelson, supra note 50, at 1944-61 (demonstrating
that § 102(b) was intended to codify the exclusion of processes, systems, and methods of
operation, in keeping with case law developed following Baker v. Selden). 
105. See Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing Copyright’s Merger Doctrine 16-19 (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with authors) (demonstrating that merger sometimes functions as
a validity doctrine or a limitation on scope and not just as a defense to infringement); see also
1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.3.2, at 2:38.1 (3d ed. Supp. 2013-1) (“As
traditionally conceived, the merger doctrine determines whether the work is copyrightable;
if the idea and expression of a jeweled bee pin merge, the pin’s creator has no copyright.”). The
U.S. Copyright Office’s Compendium of Copyright Office Practices confirms this view, iden-
tifying merger as one of the bases on which the Office may refuse registration. UNITED STATES
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 313.3(B) (3d ed.
2014).
106. See 499 U.S. at 361.
107. See id. at 343-44 (noting that Feist copied 1309 listings that were identical to listings
in Rural’s phone books, including four fictitious listings).
108. 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967). As Pam Samuelson demonstrated, courts have often
found merger even when there was more than one way to express facts, as long as the number
of ways was practically limited. See Samuelson, supra note 105, at 7-10.
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but to identify the unprotectable elements of a work that still meets
the threshold of protectability when considered as a whole. These
elements are identified so that the substantial similarity analysis
at the infringement stage can be focused on the protectable ele-
ments—although, as we describe further below, it’s not clear how
well courts actually focus the inquiry this way. In Leigh v. Warner
Brothers, Inc., for example, the court held that Leigh’s copyright in
his “photograph of a sculpture in the Bonaventure Cemetery known
as the Bird Girl” extended only to “the selection of lighting, shading,
timing, angle, and film.”109 Leigh’s copyright did not cover “the
appearance of the statue itself or of Bonaventure Cemetery, for
Leigh ha[d] no rights in the statue or its setting.”110 Taking those
unprotectable features into account, the court held that the district
court was “correct to hold as a matter of law that the film sequences
featuring the Bird Girl statue [in Warner Brothers’ film version of
the novel] are not substantially similar to the protected elements of
Leigh’s photograph,” but that there was a jury question regarding
the similarity of Warner Brothers’ photographic images, which had
“much in common with the elements protected by Leigh’s
copyright.”111
109. 212 F.3d 1210, 1213, 1215 (11th Cir. 2000). Leigh took the photo for the cover of
Midnight in the Garden of Good and Evil, a novel by John Berendt. Id. at 1213 (“After reading
a manuscript of the novel, Leigh explored appropriate settings in Savannah and ultimately
selected a photograph of a sculpture in the Bonaventure Cemetery known as the Bird Girl.
Sylvia Shaw Judson had sculpted the Bird Girl in 1938, and she produced three copies of the
statue. The Trosdal family had purchased one of the statues and placed it in their plot at
Bonaventure Cemetery. The novel does not mention the Bird Girl statue.”).
110. Id. at 1214. Courts sometimes suggest that “the merger doctrine is most applicable
where the idea and the expression are of items found in nature, or are found commonly in
everyday life.” Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 36 (1st Cir. 2001).
111. Leigh, 212 F.3d at 1215-16.
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Figure 1.
Bird Girl Statue (Leigh v. Warner Brothers)
We confess that we can’t see much, if anything, in common be-
tween these two photos other than their core subject matter. But the
court’s approach treats idea-expression and related doctrines simply
as inputs into the infringement analysis, and therefore as consider-
ations for the jury at the infringement stage.112
Courts sometimes even treat merger as a scope doctrine. In
Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., the court evaluated
Yankee’s claim that Bridgewater infringed the labels of nine candle
fragrances by first dissecting the work to remove unprotectable
elements and then “apply[ing] the doctrines of merger and scene-a-
faire to determine how ‘substantially similar’ the copy must be to
112. The Ninth Circuit treats originality as a question of validity but treats merger as an
affirmative defense to infringement, to be raised by the defendant. See Apple Comput., Inc.
v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google
Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (applying Ninth Circuit law). Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit also maintains that merger is to be evaluated as of the time of creation of the
work—meaning that the number of ways an idea can be expressed must be evaluated at the
time the allegedly infringed work is created. Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1361. For a general discus-
sion of the confused and circuit-dependent nature of dissection in infringement, see Mark A.
Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 719
(2010).
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infringe.”113 Focusing on Yankee’s labels, the court found that,
because the ideas of six of the nine labels merged with expression,
“there could be no infringement unless Bridgewater’s photographs
were ‘nearly identical’ to Yankee’s.”114 This was a matter of scope,
however, and not validity. “The merger doctrine does not,” the court
said, “allow the identical reproduction of photographs of realistic
objects when there are sufficient details in those photographs to
make them unique.”115 Thus:
If Bridgewater had scanned Yankee’s labels into a computer and
reproduced them exactly, it would have certainly infringed
Yankee’s copyrights on those labels. Even if Bridgewater had
taken its own photographs, but had arranged the subjects in a
“nearly identical” manner to that of Yankee, a jury could have
found the requisite showing of substantial similarity to support
copyright infringement.116
This kind of approach, which focuses very little on the validity
stage and treats the limiting doctrines as inputs into the infringe-
ment analysis, puts tremendous pressure on courts to tailor the
scope of rights in a work at the infringement stage. As courts typic-
ally recognize, the scope of protection to which an author is entitled
is supposed to match the size of her original contribution.117 For that
to work, validity and infringement have to be in alignment regard-
ing which elements of a work deserve protection and the scope of
protection to which a work is entitled.
In fact, existing infringement doctrine creates a number of po-
tential gaps in the fabric of the scope inquiry. First, and most
113. Yankee Candle, 259 F.3d at 34 (citing Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments,
Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 609 n.9 (1st Cir. 1988)). On this approach, “the court may find that the idea
and expression are so inseparable that copying of the work is not prohibited or that only exact
reproduction of the work will justify a finding of infringement.” Id. (quoting Concrete Mach.,
843 F.2d at 609 n.9).
114. Id. at 35. 
115. Id. at 36 (citing Concrete Mach., 843 F.2d at 607-10).
116. Id. 
117. See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir.
2008) (“So, in the case of photographs, for which Meshwerks’ digital models were designed to
serve as practically advantageous substitutes, authors are entitled to copyright protection
only for the ‘incremental contribution,’ represented by their interpretation or expression of
the objects of their attention.” (quoting SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp.
2d 301, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2000))).
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important, because of the way courts structure the infringement
inquiry, there is no guarantee that the ordinary observer’s determi-
nation of substantial similarity will be based on similarity only of
protectable elements. Thus, although in theory copyright has a
mechanism to identify the proper scope of protection, it often doesn’t
end up using that mechanism to decide cases.
There are two primary tests for infringement, both of which
separate the question of actual copying from improper appropria-
tion. Under the Second Circuit’s approach in Arnstein v. Porter, to
prove infringement, the plaintiff must establish “(a) that defendant
copied from plaintiff ’s copyrighted work and (b) that the copying
(assuming it to be proved) went so far as to constitute improper
appropriation.”118 On the first question of actual copying, “analysis
(‘dissection’) is relevant, and the testimony of experts may be
received to aid the trier of the facts. If evidence of access is absent,
the similarities must be so striking as to preclude the possibility
that plaintiff and defendant independently arrived at the same
result.”119 If actual copying is established, then the issue is “illicit
copying”—what we call legal scope—and on that issue “the test is
the response of the ordinary lay hearer,” and dissection and expert
testimony are irrelevant.120
The other primary test is the Ninth Circuit’s, which refers to the
two steps as “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” comparisons.121 Under the
“extrinsic” test, a court must determine whether there is substantial
similarity in general ideas, and it should do so not on the basis of
the responses of the trier of fact, but on “specific criteria which can
be listed and analyzed,” including the “type of artwork involved, the
materials used, the subject matter, and the setting for the sub-
ject.”122 As reformulated by the Ninth Circuit in Shaw v. Lindheim
and Cavalier v. Random House Co., this first step is not limited to
weeding out ideas but extends to anything unprotectable that is
118. 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
119. Id.
120. Id. “In some cases,” the court allowed, “the similarities between the plaintiff ’s and
defendant’s work are so extensive and striking as, without more, both to justify an inference
of copying and to prove improper appropriation.” Id. at 468-69.
121. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1165
(9th Cir. 1977).
122. Id. at 1164.
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supposed to be filtered out.123 Analytic dissection and expert tes-
timony are relevant to the extrinsic analysis, and this type of
similarity “may often be decided as a matter of law.”124 If the works
are similar under the extrinsic test, then the second question is
whether there is substantial similarity of expression.125 This sim-
ilarity is to be assessed under the “intrinsic test,” which focuses on
the impressions of the “average reasonable reader and spectator.”126
On this issue, analytic dissection and expert testimony are inappro-
priate.127 Substantial similarity under the intrinsic test is a question
of fact; indeed, “satisfaction of the extrinsic test creates a triable
issue of fact in a copyright action involving a literary work.”128
These two formulations have at least one thing in common: both
allow analytic dissection of a work to identify the protectable ele-
ments at the first stage, where the issue is actual copying, but reject
dissection in the second stage where the question is whether the
copying was improper.129 As a result, notwithstanding the frequency
with which courts say that the plaintiff must show substantial sim-
ilarity between the defendant’s work and protectable elements of
the plaintiff ’s work, nothing in the doctrinal formulation actually
requires that comparison. In fact, courts have found infringement
in a variety of questionable cases in which the similarities seem
largely to have related to unprotectable elements.130 
In Copeland v. Bieber, for instance, the Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court’s rejection of Devin Copeland’s claim that Justin
123. See Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] court must
filter out and disregard the non-protectable elements in making its substantial similarity
determination.”); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990).
124. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
125. See id.
126. Id. (quoting Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579, 582 (9th
Cir. 1944)).
127. See id.; see also Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484, 489 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[A]nalytic
dissection is inapplicable to the intrinsic analysis, because a work’s intended audience ‘does
not make the distinction’ between protectable and unprotectable elements and instead en-
counters the work ‘as one object.’” (quoting Universal Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione
Europa USA, Inc., 618 F.3d 417, 437 (4th Cir. 2010))).
128. Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1359. 
129. One of us has previously characterized this approach as “exactly backwards.” Lemley,
supra note 112, at 719.
130. See, e.g., Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Vector Intercont’l, Inc., No. C86-2671, 1986 WL
15608, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 31, 1986) (finding that a tape that controlled the Teddy Ruxpin
doll’s movements infringed plaintiff ’s copyright in its original doll).
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Bieber had infringed his copyright in the song “I Need Somebody to
Love.”131 In concluding that a jury might be able to find the songs
similar enough for infringement despite numerous dissimilarities,
the court focused on the fact that they both include the same title
lyric, “I need somebody to love.”132 Bieber pointed out that the lyric
was not original to Copeland, but the court was having none of it.133
Identifying the copied element as unprotectable was analytic dis-
section, and analytic dissection was not appropriate in the intrinsic
test, which focused on look and feel.134 Whatever the similarities be-
tween the songs, this is a ridiculous conclusion on its face; it would
allow a copyright claim against someone who explicitly copied only
things in the public domain over which the copyright owner had no
claim. But the Fourth Circuit is hardly alone in this artificial dis-
tinction.135
Courts have sometimes recognized the problem and tried to
ameliorate it by departing from the Arnstein approach and allowing
dissection, and in some cases even expert testimony, at the second
step. As the Seventh Circuit said, “[w]hile dissection is generally
disfavored, the ordinary observer test, in application, must take into
account that the copyright laws preclude appropriation of only those
elements of the work that are protected by the copyright.”136 Other
courts have tried to focus the ordinary observer inquiry by having
the court first identify which elements of the plaintiff ’s work are
protectable. In Yankee Candle, for example, the First Circuit said
that, for purposes of evaluating substantial similarity:
131. See 789 F.3d at 495.
132. See id. at 494.
133. See id. at 492-93.
134. See id. at 489.
135. Among other cases, the Ninth Circuit in Meridian Textiles, Inc. v. Topson Downs of
California, Inc. held that a jury was entitled to decide whether the defendant’s use of a zebra
stripe design infringed the plaintiff ’s zebra stripe design. See 605 F. App’x 671, 672 (9th Cir.
2015). The district court had granted summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff ’s
design was too similar to every other zebra stripe out there to be protectable, but the court
reversed, saying that the plaintiff could have a copyright because there was no evidence it cop-
ied from the prior art. See id. In a separate part of the opinion, the court then concluded that
the jury would get to decide the similarity of the two designs, apparently without the benefit
of the fact that there was nothing in the plaintiff ’s design that was not in countless prior
designs. See id.
136. Atari, Inc., v. N. Am. Phillips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir.
1982); see also Susan Wakeen Doll Co. v. Ashton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 451 (7th Cir.
2001) (noting, approvingly, that the jury had heard expert testimony regarding similarities).
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The extent to which [plaintiff ’s work] contain[s] protected ex-
pression is a matter of law, determined by the court. Once this
determination is made, the question of whether two works are
substantially similar (and corresponding application of the or-
dinary observer test) is a matter for the trier of fact unless
summary judgment is proper.137
Similarly, in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the Ninth
Circuit held that in a case involving computer software, once the
plaintiff had satisfied the extrinsic test, a court should frame the
comparison for purposes of the intrinsic test.138 “Using analytic
dissection, and, if necessary, expert testimony, the court must de-
termine whether any of the allegedly similar features are protected
by copyright.”139 Then, 
[h]aving dissected the alleged similarities and considered the
range of possible expression, the court must define the scope of
the plaintiff’s copyright—that is, decide whether the work is
entitled to “broad” or “thin” protection. Depending on the degree
of protection, the court must set the appropriate standard for a
subjective comparison of the works to determine whether, as a
whole, they are sufficiently similar to support a finding of illicit
copying.140
In a later case, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that, at least in soft-
ware cases, “[a]nalytic dissection is relevant not only to the copying
element of a copyright infringement claim, but also to the claim’s
ownership element.”141 
Courts also sometimes ratchet up the level of similarity necessary
to find infringement in cases in which copyright protection is sup-
posed to be “thin.” In these cases, courts have required that the
137. Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 34 n.5 (1st Cir. 2001) (cit-
ing Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608-09 (1st Cir.
1988)).
138. 35 F.3d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994).
139. Id. at 1443.
140. Id.; see also Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475 (9th Cir.
1992) (approving of the district court’s dissection of the plaintiff ’s work for the “purpose of
determining ‘whether similarities [between the programs] result from unprotectable [or
protected] expression’” (quoting Data E. USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir.
1988))) (alteration in original).
141. Brown Bag, 960 F.2d at 1476.
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defendant’s work be not just substantially similar to the plaintiff ’s,
but “virtually identical,”142 or they have required substantial sim-
ilarity from the perspective of the “more discerning observer,” rather
than the “ordinary observer.”143
Courts seem most eager to depart from the two-step process and
allow dissection and expert testimony in cases involving software,
reflecting concern that ordinary observers will have too much
difficulty assessing similarity of such complex works.144 Several
courts have followed the Second Circuit’s abstraction-filtration-
comparison approach from Computer Associates International, Inc.
v. Altai, Inc., a particularly structured approach to substantial
similarity under which a court first dissects the plaintiff ’s work into
elements at varying levels of abstraction, then filters out the
unprotectable elements, and finally compares the allegedly infring-
ing work to the remaining “kernels” of creative expression.145 But
this approach seems to treat software as a special case. Elsewhere
the notion that particular copyrightable elements should be flagged
for purposes of comparison is in constant tension with the require-
ment that the works be compared “as a whole,” particularly in those
cases that emphasize the “total look and feel” of the works.146 
Lack of clarity about whether and when the substantial similar-
ity analysis will explicitly take scope into account is exacerbated
by the fact that allocation of decisionmaking in copyright cases is
142. See, e.g., Apple, 35 F.3d at 1442; Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d
972, 979-80 (2d Cir. 1980).
143. See, e.g., Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 271-72 (2d Cir. 2001). 
144. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3d Cir.
1986) (“We therefore join the growing number of courts which do not apply the ordinary ob-
server test in copyright cases involving exceptionally difficult materials, like computer
programs, but instead adopt a single substantial similarity inquiry according to which both
lay and expert testimony would be admissible.”). 
145. 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software,
Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1342-43 (5th Cir. 1994); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9
F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993). On the consensus behind the Altai framework, see Mark A.
Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software Copyright?, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 14-15 (1995).
146. Courts seem particularly drawn to the “total feel” approach in cases involving visual
works. See, e.g., Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127,
134 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Essentially, the total-concept-and-feel locution functions as a reminder
that, while the infringement analysis must begin by dissecting the copyrighted work into its
component parts in order to clarify precisely what is not original, infringement analysis is not
simply a matter of ascertaining similarity between components viewed in isolation.”); Roth
Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
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remarkably unclear. Some courts treat copyrightability as a ques-
tion of fact for purposes of assessing validity.147 The Seventh Circuit
treats it as a question of law.148 The Ninth Circuit has issued con-
flicting decisions on the respective roles of judge and jury.149 When
validity and infringement are determined by different decision-
makers, there is no reason to be confident that the scope limitations
presumed at the validity stage will in fact be reflected at the in-
fringement stage.
In the now-famous “Blurred Lines” copyright trial, for instance,
the jury was asked to decide only whether the written chords and
lyrics of Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams’s hit song were too
similar to Marvin Gaye’s song “Got to Give It Up.”150 Because
Marvin Gaye did not have a copyright that extended to his tempo or
vocal style, the relevant comparison should have been between
Thicke and Williams’s song and Gaye’s written work, not between
the sound of the two songs.151 But it is hard to believe the jury
actually ignored similarities in the unprotectable elements, or the
evidence of the defendants’ intent to imitate Gaye’s style. And if
they did in fact do as they were told, it is hard to see how they could
have found sufficient similarity. By handing the overall works to the
jury, the court undid whatever limits the rules of copyright placed
on the scope of Gaye’s right.152
147. See, e.g., Matthew Bender & Co. v. W. Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 681 (2d Cir. 1998)
(“[W]e treat the question of whether particular elements of a work demonstrate sufficient
originality and creativity to warrant copyright protection as a question for the factfinder.”). 
148. See Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 517 (7th Cir. 2009) (“In this
circuit, copyrightability is an issue of law for the court.”).
149. Compare Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Wheth-
er a particular photograph is protected by copyright law is a mixed question of law and fact,
also subject to de novo review.”), with Meridian Textiles, Inc. v. Topson Downs of Cal., Inc.,
605 F. App’x 671, 672 (9th Cir. 2015) (treating the originality of the plaintiff ’s work as a ques-
tion of fact for the jury), and N. Coast Indus. v. Jason Maxwell, Inc., 972 F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th
Cir. 1992) (same).
150. See Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL
4479500, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015).
151. See id. at *18.
152. See Wendy Gordon, How the Jury in the ‘Blurred Lines’ Case Was Misled, CONVERSA-
TION (Mar. 17, 2015, 5:47 AM), http://theconversation.com/how-the-jury-in-the-blurred-lines-
case-was-misled-38751 [https://perma.cc/C6YK-LJP9] (questioning the instructions given to
the jury); Chris Richards, It’s Okay if You Hate Robin Thicke. But the ‘Blurred Lines’ Verdict
Is Bad for Pop Music, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
arts-and-entertainment/wp/2015/03/11/the-blurred-lines-of-the-blurred-lines-verdict/ [https://
perma.cc/9RWG-925S] (noting the dissimilarity between the lyrics and notes).
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Misalignment may arise even within the infringement analysis
because allocation of decisionmaking between the two parts of the
tests is also unclear. According to Arnstein, both actual copying and
improper appropriation are issues of fact.153 The Yankee Candle and
Apple v. Microsoft approaches maintain the factfinder’s role in
making the ultimate assessment of substantial similarity, but they
require the court to frame the comparison at the improper appropri-
ation (or intrinsic comparison) stage, implying either that dissection
is for the court or that improper appropriation at least requires
guidance from the court.154 
The problems with the fracturing of these inquiries is worse when
different decisionmakers are involved at the various stages, but we
think the prospect for misalignment is real even when the same
decisionmaker is responsible for all of the determinations. Indeed,
recent empirical work by Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Irina Manta,
and Tess Wilkinson-Ryan suggests that judgments of similarity may
often be contaminated by information relating to the defendant’s
actual copying.155 Specifically, the authors find “an appreciable
upward shift in subjects’ assessments of similarity between the
works” when they were “provided with additional information about
the simple fact of copying or the creative effort that went into the
protected work.”156 And if evidence of copying affects even the
judgment of similarity, it’s hard to believe that a decisionmaker who
has already concluded that the defendant copied could focus the
substantial similarity analysis on particular protectable elements
153. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1946); see also Leigh v. Warner
Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1213 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Copyright infringement is generally a
question of fact for the jury to decide.”). For an argument that Arnstein was in fact about the
fact-law distinction and the proper role of judge and jury, and only secondarily about the
standard for copyright infringement, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Questionable Origins
of the Copyright Infringement Analysis 6 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 15-28, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2654537 [https://
perma.cc/DP8E-G3NH].
154. See supra notes 113-17 and 139-41 and accompanying text.
155. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al., Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267, 270-71
(2014).
156. Id. at 271. The study’s methodology assumed that the party assessing similarity would
have encountered information about actual copying but would not actually have had to arrive
at that conclusion herself. That arrangement obviously does not match the decisionmaking
architecture in all jurisdictions. It seems reasonable, however, to conclude that the contam-
ination effect might even be stronger when a particular decisionmaker herself determined
that the defendant had actually copied. 
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rather than considering evidence of copying of unprotectable pieces
as well.157
While the errors in copyright largely run in the direction of over-
protection because of insufficient focus on the protectable elements
at the substantial similarity phase, sometimes that problem causes
errors in the other direction. Courts have, for example, sometimes
found merger despite the fact that there seemed to be many other
ways to express the idea underlying the plaintiff ’s work. They have
done so because of uncertainty about how to determine which of
those alternatives would infringe, typically where the plaintiff ov-
erclaimed. In Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, for
example, the court held that the plaintiff could not claim copyright
in a jeweled bee pin because allowing protection would give it a
monopoly on depicting bees in jeweled pins.158
Figure 2.
Jeweled Bee Pin (Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian)
157. In Whelan, the court suggested that if the same decisionmaker was involved at both
stages of the substantial similarity inquiry, it might not matter whether expert testimony and
dissection are technically relevant at the improper appropriation stage. Whelan Assocs., Inc.
v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he distinction between
the two parts of the Arnstein test may be of doubtful value when the finder of fact is the same
person for each step: that person has been exposed to expert evidence in the first step, yet she
or he is supposed to ignore or ‘forget’ that evidence in analyzing the problem under the second
step. Especially in complex cases, we doubt that the ‘forgetting’ can be effective when the
expert testimony is essential to even the most fundamental understanding of the objects in
question.”). The Balganesh study suggests the court was right to doubt the decisionmaker’s
ability to “forget,” but that the problem of forgetting is more likely to relate to evidence of
actual copying. See Balganesh et al., supra note 155, at 269.
158. See 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
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That result has struck some observers as bizarre, because there
are obviously many ways to design a jeweled bee pin.159 But we
think that criticism misses the obvious point that the plaintiff asked
the court to recognize rights of astonishing scope. As the court said:
The breadth of this claim is evident. For example, while a
photograph of the copyrighted bee pin attached to the complaint
depicts a bee with nineteen small white jewels on its back,
plaintiff argues that its copyright is infringed by defendants’
entire line of a score or more jeweled bees in three sizes deco-
rated with from nine to thirty jewels of various sizes, kinds, and
colors.
Although plaintiff ’s counsel asserted that the originality of
plaintiff ’s bee pin lay in a particular arrangement of jewels on
the top of the pin, the elements of this arrangement were never
identified. Defendants’ witnesses testified that the “arrange-
ment” was simply a function of the size and form of the bee pin
and the size of the jewels used. Plaintiff ’s counsel, repeatedly
pressed by the district judge, was unable to suggest how jewels
might be placed on the back of a pin in the shape of a bee
without infringing plaintiff ’s copyright. He eventually conceded,
“not being a jeweler, I can’t conceive of how he might rearrange
the design so it is dissimilar.”160
As the court rightly recognized, “[i]f plaintiff ’s understanding of
its rights were correct, its copyright would effectively prevent others
from engaging in the business of manufacturing and selling jeweled
bees.”161 In an ideal world, the court would have had at its disposal
a mechanism by which the protectable elements of the plaintiff ’s bee
pins could have been identified, and the court then could have
resolved the particular case by comparing the defendant’s bee pins
to those protectable elements. In the absence of a reliable mecha-
nism of that sort, the court felt it had no choice but to declare the
bee pins uncopyrightable.162
159. To wit, a search of “bee pin” on Amazon.com, limited to jewelry, returns nearly 500
results from more than 50 designers.
160. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp., 446 F.2d at 740.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 742.
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2. Patent
As we will see in the next Part, utility patent law does more than
its sister doctrines to evaluate the scope of a patent right in an
integrated fashion. The patent claims themselves are an effort to
define the scope of the legal right ex ante. And the pretrial Mark-
man hearing requires the parties to resolve the scope of the patent
right before either validity or infringement is established.163
Nonetheless, patent law too has gaps that result from its sep-
aration of validity and infringement. The first and most obvious of
these gaps involves defendants who practice a technology that is al-
ready in the prior art. Because patent law requires that an inven-
tion be novel and nonobvious,164 it should be clear that a patent
owner is not entitled to sue someone for using technology that
existed before she ever “invented” it. Nonetheless, the Federal Cir-
cuit has repeatedly held that there is no “practicing the prior art”
defense in patent law.165 As Timothy Lau has ably explained, this
rather bizarre rule results from the separation of patent law doc-
trines into validity and infringement.166 Because the patent owner
bears the burden of proving infringement but the defendant must
prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence, courts worry that
defendants can skimp on their burden of proof that the defendant’s
technology was in fact in the prior art.167 But the fact that the courts
will not recognize practicing the prior art as a defense means that
defendants who are in fact engaged in what should be permitted ac-
tivity do not always have a fair opportunity to prove it. In theory,
the Markman hearing solves this problem by treating validity and
infringement together in an integrated proceeding.168 But the
163. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. In part for this reason, Janson Rantanen has
argued that patent rights, which seem to be immutable once the claims are written, are in fact
more malleable and contextual than one would think. See Jason Rantanen, The Malleability
of Patent Rights, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 895, 898.
164. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2012).
165. See, e.g., Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Grp., Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1025 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (“‘[P]racticing the prior art’ is not a defense to patent infringement.”); Tate Access
Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]here
is no ‘practicing the prior art’ defense to literal infringement.”).
166. See Timothy Lau, Defensive Use of Prior Art to Exonerate Accused Acts in U.S. and
Chinese Patent Litigation, 27 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 51, 60-61 (2013).
167. See Lemley, supra note 24, at 1271, 1276.
168. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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Federal Circuit has discouraged courts from focusing much atten-
tion on validity during Markman.169 A district court may construe
the patent claims for infringement purposes without focusing on the
possibility that a claim construed so broadly might be invalid. And
when the issue of validity does arise, district courts and juries may
be reluctant (even apart from the high standard of proof) to hold the
patent altogether invalid.
Patent owners can and do exploit this gap with some regularity.
Relying both on the higher standard of proof for invalidity than non-
infringement and the demonstrated reluctance of juries to invali-
date patents, patent owners are often willing to trade a greater risk
of eventual invalidity to gain a broad scope for their possibly invalid
patent claims.170 Sometimes this gamble fails. In Liebel-Flarsheim
Co. v. Medrad, Inc., for instance, the patentee succeeded in persuad-
ing the court to construe its claim to be much broader than the thing
it had actually invented,171 only to have the claim ultimately inval-
idated as insufficiently supported by the patent disclosure.172 But
more often the strategy succeeds, either in court or in settlement
before trial.173 This is a particular problem with “bottom-feeder”
169. While it was traditionally a rule of patent claim construction that claims were to be
construed to preserve their validity, that canon is in disrepute in the Federal Circuit right
now. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (dismissing
that canon as one “of limited utility in any event” and saying that “we have not applied that
principle broadly”). The reason once again can be traced to a scope gap: different decision-
makers evaluate claim construction and infringement, and they do so at different times. The
Federal Circuit was concerned about treading on the province of the jury to evaluate validity.
See id. at 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting). But the result has been that claim construction and
infringement are assessed without a clear idea of whether the patentee is seeking excessive
scope. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 160 (2006).
170. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 212 (1998) (finding that juries uphold patents 67 percent of the
time, while judges in bench trials do so only 57 percent of the time). More recent evidence
suggests that the gap has disappeared, though that trend seems to be driven primarily by
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) cases, which are decided by judges, not juries. See
John R. Allison et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 1769, 1790 (2014); Lemley, supra note 72, at 1734.
171. 358 F.3d 898, 912 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
172. Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007). For a
discussion of other cases presenting this sort of overclaiming, see Holbrook, supra note 7, at
800-03.
173. The overwhelming majority of patent cases settle before trial. See, e.g., John R. Allison
et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 689
(2011) (finding that between 84 and 91 percent of cases settle); Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn
G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and
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patent trolls who are only interested in coercing a nuisance-value
settlement based on the cost and uncertainty of litigation.174 The
practical effect of not having a practicing the prior art defense is
that some defendants who are actually using old technology are
nonetheless held liable, and more are forced to pay settlements to
avoid the risk of losing a case that, in theory, they should win.
A final example of a scope gap in patent law operates against pat-
entees rather than for them. Patent law is designed to cover new
inventions but not to preempt abstract ideas altogether.175 Paten-
tees in computer software, following the playbook that has worked
for them in the practicing the prior art example, have sought broad-
er and broader interpretations of their patent claims, to the point
where many claims are not limited either to a particular computer
algorithm or approach or to a particular hardware implementation.
Rather, they claim any computer configured in any way to achieve
a particular result.176 But in this case, the backlash against that
functional claiming has been spectacular. The Supreme Court held
in 2014 that claims of this sort are not patent-eligible at all,177 and
the lower courts have already invalidated dozens of patents on this
ground.178 The fact that the scope determination got pushed into
Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 273-74 (2006) (finding that between
65 and 68 percent of cases settle).
174. For a discussion of the bottom-feeder troll business model, see Mark A. Lemley & A.
Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2121-24 (2013).
175. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354-55 (2014) (“[W]e
must distinguish between patents that claim the ‘buildin[g] block[s]’ of human ingenuity and
those that integrate the building blocks into something more, thereby ‘transform[ing]’ them
into a patent-eligible invention. The former ‘would risk disproportionately tying up the use
of the underlying’ ideas and are therefore ineligible for patent protection. The latter pose no
comparable risk of preemption, and therefore remain eligible for the monopoly granted under
our patent laws.”) (alterations in original) (citations omitted); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593,
609 (2010) (rejecting patent claim on the grounds that “it claims an abstract idea”).
176. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Functionality Malfunction and the Problem
of Overbroad, Functional Software Patents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1399, 1405 (2013) (discuss-
ing the overbreadth problem and advocating an algorithmic approach to analysis); Mark A.
Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 905, 907
(discussing the breadth of this phenomenon and the problems it causes); Kyle O. Logan, Step-
Plus-Function Claims: An Analysis of Federal Circuit Law, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 907 (2014) (looking at the issue of overbreadth as a failure of the construction of
35 U.S.C. § 112(f)).
177. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360.
178. See, e.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 722 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer,
J., concurring) (rejecting patent claim on the “concept ... that people will be willing to watch
2016] SCOPE 2243
validity made it an all-or-nothing exercise, and in this case paten-
tees end up getting nothing as a result of their overreaching, even
if they would have a valid narrower claim to a particular software
algorithm. 
3. Trademark
Trademark law has, especially relative to copyright, several valid-
ity doctrines with some bite. Most importantly for our purposes,
valid marks must be distinctive and nonfunctional.179 But courts
tend to rely primarily on the likelihood of confusion factors and on
certain defendant-specific doctrines like descriptive fair use to man-
age the scope of trademark rights. Validity and infringement are
interrelated here. Distinctiveness, trademark law’s core validity
concept, significantly affects scope through the likelihood of con-
fusion factors precisely because distinctiveness can only be assessed
in relation to particular goods or services.180 Thus, though trade-
mark rights are no longer strictly limited to the goods for which the
plaintiff uses the mark,181 those goods continue to anchor the like-
lihood of confusion analysis through the similarity of goods factor.182 
online advertisements in exchange for the opportunity to view copyrighted material”);
buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (rejecting a patent claim
related to online transactions as “squarely about creating a contractual relationship” and thus
“directed to an abstract idea”); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758
F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (applying the Alice test to patent claim related to digital
image processing to reject the claim as directed to an abstract idea).
179. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), (e)(5) (2012).
180. Courts determine the distinctiveness of word marks by placing them in categories
along the Abercrombie spectrum according to the relationship between the mark and the
goods. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
181. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 67, at 140 (highlighting a trademark claim by
Soccer United Marketing against Black & Decker as an example of “trademark owners ...
asserting the right to own markets themselves because ... the relevant market owes its origin
to their brands”).
182. The well-known Polaroid factors were developed explicitly to gauge the likelihood of
confusion in the case of noncompeting products. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp.,
287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (“Where the products are different, the prior owner’s chance
of success is a function of many variables: the strength of his mark, the degree of similarity
between the two marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will
bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in adopting its
own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the sophistication of the buyers.”). Each of
the courts of appeals has its own, nonexhaustive set of likelihood of confusion factors, though
there is substantial overlap among them. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
2244 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:2197
But similarity of goods is only one dimension of relevant similar-
ity, and infringement is determined by evaluating the confusion
factors flexibly, with no one factor being dispositive.183 In general,
we can say that the more similar the mark and the more similar the
goods or services, the more likely the use infringes, but there is no
definitive threshold level of similarity of mark or of goods that
makes another’s use noninfringing.184 And, importantly from our
perspective, while the confusion factors require assessment of confu-
sion as a result of the defendant’s use of a mark and courts therefore
often focus on features of the relevant marks, none of the factors
explicitly seek to ascertain whether the features of the defendant’s
mark that are causing the confusion are features that define the
plaintiff ’s protectable interest. 
This isn’t to say that the confusion analysis doesn’t in some
ways take scope into account. In fact, it is black letter law that the
amount of similarity necessary to support a likelihood of confusion
finding is a function of the strength of the plaintiff ’s trademark.185
Strong trademarks get broader protection.186 And while strength
§§ 20-23 (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
183. See Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Grp. of Am., Inc., 269 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2001)
(noting that although the Polaroid factors are important in determining infringement, no one
factor is dispositive and courts should focus on “the ultimate question of whether consumers
are likely to be confused” (quoting Paddington Corp. v. Altiki Imps. & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d
577, 584 (2d Cir. 1993))). But cf. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests
for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1587 (2006) (“A finding that the simi-
larity of the marks factor does not favor a likelihood of confusion is, in practice, dispositive,
and a finding that the proximity of the goods factor does not favor a likelihood of confusion is
nearly dispositive.... Meanwhile, ... a finding of bad faith intent is in fact dispositive.”). 
184. See Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e have never
countenanced a likelihood of confusion determination based on a consideration of dissimilarity
alone.”).
185. See Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The strength of
a trademark encompasses two different concepts, both of which relate significantly to like-
lihood of consumer confusion. The first and most important is inherent strength, also called
‘inherent distinctiveness.’ This inquiry distinguishes between, on the one hand, inherently
distinctive marks—marks that are arbitrary or fanciful in relation to the products (or
services) on which they are used—and, on the other hand, marks that are generic, descriptive
or suggestive as to those goods. The former are the strong marks. The second sense of the
concept of strength of a mark is ‘acquired distinctiveness,’ i.e., fame, or the extent to which
prominent use of the mark in commerce has resulted in a high degree of consumer recog-
nition.”) (citation omitted). 
186. See id. (“[T]he law accords broad, muscular protection to marks that are arbitrary or
fanciful in relation to the products on which they are used, and lesser protection, or no
protection at all, to marks consisting of words that identify or describe the goods or their
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relates primarily to consumer recognition of a mark, in assessing
strength many courts consider whether others in the relevant
market also use the claimed mark to identify their own goods or
services.187 When a number of parties are using the same or a
similar mark, each party’s rights are narrow.188 In Eastland Music
Group, LLC v. Lionsgate Entertainment, Inc., for example, the court
noted the extensive prior use of “the phrase 50/50 or a sound-alike
variant (50-50, fifty-fifty, fifty/fifty)” as the “title of intellectual prop-
erty” and therefore held that, by entering such a crowded field,
Eastland’s rights in its Phifty-50 mark, which it used for a rap duo,
were “weak and narrow.”189 The Federal Circuit recently expounded
on this doctrine at length, suggesting that it may play a greater role
at the PTO at least.190
Courts have been most successful in aligning scope at the valid-
ity and infringement stages when, as in Eastland, they expressly
attributes.”).
187. See First Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 645, 654 (10th Cir. 1996)
(“[W]e recognized the well-established principle that extensive third-party use of the disputed
term indicates that the term itself deserves only weak protection.”). When assessing strength
in the likelihood of confusion contexts, courts have sometimes looked more broadly, viewing
as relevant the extent to which a mark has been used by others in any market. See, e.g.,
Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 1159 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that
absence of third-party use contributes to the strength of a trademark); Sun Banks of Fla., Inc.
v. Sun Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 651 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[W]e find the extensive
third-party use of the word ‘Sun’ impressive evidence that there would be no likelihood of
confusion between Sun Banks and Sun Federal.”); Amstar Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 615
F.2d 252, 259-60 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding extensive third-party uses of “Domino” limited
protection of plaintiff ’s mark outside the uses to which it had already put its mark). Sara
Stadler Nelson has thus argued that uniqueness is really what the courts are interested in
when they talk about strength. See Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark
Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 731, 734-36 (2003).
188. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 11:85 (“In a ‘crowded’ field of look-alike marks, each
member of the crowd is relatively ‘weak’ in its ability to prevent use by others in the crowd.”).
189. 707 F.3d 869, 871 (7th Cir. 2013). To our point about the difficulty of separating issues
between validity and infringement, the Seventh Circuit also noted that “the principal reason
[Phifty-50] was registrable is that it is a made-up homophone of a familiar phrase, which in
ordinary usage is suggestive or descriptive.” Id. Implying then that perhaps the issue was
actually distinctiveness, the court said “[i]t takes a powerful showing of association between
such an expression and a particular producer of goods to establish a trademark claim—and
Eastland Music has not attempted such a showing.” Id.
190. See Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(holding that the Peace and Love trademark, while valid, was narrow because it was diluted
by the presence of many other similar marks, and therefore could not preclude defendant from
selling “Peace Love and Juice” drinks).
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consider those two issues together and specifically describe the
aspects of the plaintiff ’s mark that warrant protection. In Star In-
dustries, Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., the court found Star Industries’s “O”
design inherently distinctive because it “had sufficient shape and
color stylization to render it slightly more than a simply linear rep-
resentation of an ellipse or the letter ‘O’” and was “a unique design
in the alcoholic beverage industry at the time it was introduced.”191
But, the court noted, “the extent of stylization was marginal at best.
The outline of the ‘O,’ though not uniform, is ordinary in its slightly
varying width, and the interior and exterior borders are also ordi-
nary.”192 As a result, Star Industries had only a “‘thin’ or weak
mark, which [was] entitled to only limited protection.”193 Having
called out the specific aspects of Star’s “O” design that made it
protectable, the court could compare Bacardi’s “O” with those
specific features in mind. Unsurprisingly, the court then found that
Bacardi’s orange “O” design was not likely to cause confusion.
Figure 3.
“O” Design (Star Industries v. Bacardi)
In our view, a court should come to a similar conclusion in
Adidas’s claim against Marc Jacobs. Adidas, which owns a three-
stripe design mark for shoes that it also applies to clothing, has
sued Marc Jacobs for putting four stripes on its clothes.194 Despite
191. 412 F.3d 373, 383 (2d Cir. 2005).
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Complaint, Adidas Am., Inc. v. Marc Jacobs Int’l, LLC, No. 03:15-cv-582, 2015 WL
1569601 (D. Or. Apr. 8, 2015); see Jonathan Randles, Adidas Accuses Marc Jacobs of Ripping
Off 3-Stripe Design, LAW360 (Apr. 8, 2015, 6:15 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/640950/
adidas-accuses-marc-jacobs-of-ripping-off-3-stripe-design [https://perma.cc/VTJ2-QVFK].
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the similarity in some of the colors and the width, we doubt that a
mark consisting of three vertical stripes could be broad enough in
scope to cover anything but an essentially exact copy.195
Figure 4.
Three-Stripe Mark (Adidas v. Marc Jacobs)
Adidas Marc Jacobs
But courts have had a much easier time doing this with relatively
simple marks—single letter designs like a stylized “O” or combina-
tions of letters—than with compound, contextual marks. Thus, we
can imagine a court applying this principle to deal with Lagunitas
Brewing’s recent suit against Sierra Nevada Brewing.196 Lagunitas
claimed that Sierra Nevada infringed its rights in an “‘IPA’ family
of trademarks.”197 Lagunitas admitted that “other brewers have
adopted the shorthand parlance of ‘IPA’ to market their India Pale
Ales,” and indeed the “IPA” designation is in widespread use by a
195. For one thing, unlike when they are used on the side of athletic shoes, we doubt that
four vertical stripes on the sleeves of clothing serve the source identifying function as strong-
ly. Hence, though we have some doubts about the correctness of the decision on its own terms,
we would distinguish Adidas-America, Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 1029
(D. Or. 2008), in which the court found the defendant’s use of four stripes on shoes to violate
Adidas’s rights. In our view, the stripes on the arms of the clothing depicted above are much
more likely to be seen as decorative. 
196. Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Lagunitas Brewing Co. v. Sierra Nevada Brewing
Co., No. 3:15-cv-00153-EDL (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2015). The complaint has since been with-
drawn.
197. Id. ¶ 11.
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variety of different brewers.198 The term IPA itself is therefore likely
generic and unprotectable.
Figure 5.
General Comparison of IPA Labels
Nevertheless, Lagunitas insisted that the “unique ‘IPA’ lettering
used in the Lagunitas ‘IPA’ Family of Trademarks has a distinctive
serif font, distinctive kerning (or letter spacing), between the ‘P’ and
the ‘A’, slightly aged or weathered look, with uneven areas on each
of the letters, and the elimination of any periods between the let-
ters.”199
198. Id.; see also infra Figure 5.
199. Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 196, ¶ 16; see also infra Figure 6.
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Figure 6.
Comparison of IPA Labels (Lagunitas Brewing v. Sierra Nevada
Brewing)
According to Lagunitas, Sierra Nevada’s new Hop Hunter IPA
packaging infringed Lagunitas’ family of IPA marks:
This proposed [Sierra Nevada] design uses all capital, large,
bold, black “IPA” lettering in a font selection that is remarkably
similar to the iconic Lagunitas design and, indeed, is the central
and most prominent feature of the new Sierra Nevada design,
emulating the iconic Lagunitas Family of IPA Trademarks. [The
design] even uses the kerning between the “P” and the “A”
characters that is distinctive to the Lagunitas Family of IPA
Trademarks, and in the case of the “neck” label, the proposed
Sierra Nevada “IPA” lettering is depicted with the aged or
weathered look distinctive to the iconic Lagunitas IPA Family of
Trademarks.200
Once we look not just at the plaintiff ’s and defendant’s marks, but
also at the other uses of IPA, it becomes clear that any protectable
element in the IPA mark is extremely narrow. But a jury that con-
siders only infringement might not focus on those limitations unless
they are explicitly made part of the strength analysis. Even then the
limitations might not exert the force they should, since strength is
only one factor in determining likelihood of confusion.
Courts have an especially difficult time managing the scope of
complex marks with multiple elements, including trade dress. One
200. Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 196, ¶ 20.
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reason is the greater difficulty defining the mark in these cases.
Take, for example, the recent decision in Reynolds Consumer Prod-
ucts v. Handi-Foil Corp.201 In that case, Reynolds objected to the
packaging of a new line of Handi-Foil aluminum foil products.202
Reynolds claimed to own rights in the “overall look, feel and com-
mercial impression of its Reynolds Wrap packaging design.”203
Specifically, Reynolds identified at least twelve elements that make
up this common law trade dress:
(a) the color scheme; (b) the use of the color scheme; (c) the use
of prominent lettering within the blue section; (d) the use of
silver bands to separate the blue and pink sections; (e) the
placement of the quantity information; (f) the inclusion of the
“made in the U.S.A.” lettering; (g) the repetition of the color
scheme and type on the ends of the boxes; (h) the “press here to
lock” feature at the ends of the boxes; (i) the use of graphics with
how-to information; (j) the “Lift” graphic; (k) the positioning of
the brand name on the top flap of the box; and (l) the color
yellow, placement, and text used to caution the consumer.204
Though it noted the maxim that trade dress with more elements
tends to have narrower scope, the court never addressed validity or
attempted to identify the features that made the Reynolds trade
dress protectable.205 It simply engaged in a side-by-side comparison
of Handi-Foil’s and Reynolds’s packages, which was enough for the
court to conclude that “the similarity between the overall impres-
sions” was “striking.”206
201. No. 1:13-CV-214, 2014 WL 3615853 (E.D. Va. July 18, 2014).
202. See id. at *1.
203. Id. at *7.
204. Id. 
205. See id. at *8.
206. Id. at *9. 
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Figure 7.
Comparison of Reynolds Wrap and Handi-Foil Packaging Design
(Reynolds v. Handi-Foil )
In fact, the court thought the similarities were striking “even if the
boxes’ color schemes [were] put aside.”207 What were the damning
similarities? 
[T]he two boxes both say “non-stick” and “heavy duty.” The
Reynolds box says “foods lift right off!” and the Handi-Foil box
says “Food Easily Lifts Off!” Both boxes place the (identical)
square footage on the right end of the box, with the metric
conversions typed neatly below. Additionally, the two-dimen-
sional images above cannot capture the similarity of the boxes’
side and end panels, all of which bear striking semblance. Add
to these characteristics the “Made in USA” language on the right
portion of the boxes in Example No. 1.208
These elements of similarity, and the court’s belief that Handi-Foil
attempted to mimic the Reynolds Wrap box in order to enter the
aluminum foil market, convinced the court that the jury’s trade
dress verdict was reasonable.209 In fact, according to the court, “any
other finding may well have been unreasonable.”210
The problem with this conclusion is that the elements of similar-
ity called out by the court were not even elements of the trade dress
articulated by Reynolds, very likely because those elements almost
207. Id. 
208. Id. at *8.
209. See id. 
210. Id. 
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certainly were not things Reynolds was entitled to own. Phrases like
“Food Easily Lifts Off” and “Made in the USA” are clearly descrip-
tive, so any rights Reynolds owned in relation to the phrases must
have been related to the particular stylization, which Handi-Foil did
not copy. When one limits the trade dress in the Reynolds Wrap
packaging to only the sorts of things Reynolds is legally entitled to
own, the similarities disappear. But because the court treated in-
fringement separately from the question of validity, it reached a
clearly incorrect result. This kind of gap is the result of separating
validity from infringement and particularly the lack of any integrat-
ed mechanism by which to delineate the proper scope of Reynolds’s
rights. Indeed, whether any of the similarities ought to have been
relevant to a confusion analysis depends on the scope of Reynolds’s
rights, an issue which the court never even engaged. 
Many courts have responded to this challenge in trade dress cases
by requiring claimants to identify the elements of the claimed trade
dress.211 As these courts recognize, it is impossible to determine the
scope of a party’s rights without first definitively ascertaining the
claimed property. But as the Reynolds case demonstrates, articulat-
ing the elements of the trade dress is not sufficient because courts
are reluctant to identify specifically which of those elements triggers
protectability.212 Especially with trade dress, courts are often con-
cerned that, by highlighting particular elements, a factfinder might
lose track of the totality of the trade dress and “miss an overall sim-
ilarity.”213
The risk in refusing to highlight particular features is that sim-
ilarity judgments will be driven by similarity of the unprotectable
211. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 415 (6th Cir. 2006) (“In
requiring a list of ‘discrete elements,’ we are looking to avoid ‘vague and indeterminate ref-
erences to the “overall appearance” or “look” of plaintiff ’s packaging.’” (quoting 1 MCCARTHY,
supra note 23, § 8:3)); Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 116-17 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“[W]e hold that a plaintiff seeking to protect its trade dress in a line of products must ar-
ticulate the design elements that compose the trade dress.”).
212. See Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1050 (9th
Cir. 1998) (“[T]he proper inquiry is not whether individual features of a product are functional
or nondistinctive but whether the whole collection of features taken together are functional
or nondistinctive.”).
213. August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1995). This is simply
an application of the familiar antidissection rule, under which “a composite mark is tested for
its validity and distinctiveness by looking at it as a whole, rather than dissecting it into its
component parts.” 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 11:27.
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features. In theory, a court could guard against this improper influ-
ence by requiring a well-constructed survey that used the closest
noninfringing substitute as a control, thereby differentiating con-
fusion that resulted from copying of protectable elements from any
other form of confusion. But in practice there are several problems
with that approach. First, Barton Beebe’s empirical research sug-
gests courts don’t often rely on surveys, emphasizing them only to
support conclusions they have reached for other reasons.214 Second,
and probably more importantly, one would have to identify the pro-
tectable elements of the trade dress and differentiate them from
unprotectable elements even to construct the kind of survey we have
in mind, in which the closest noninfringing substitute is used as the
control.215 Courts’ reluctance to define the scope of the trade dress
therefore infects their ability to evaluate the quality of a control. 
Take, for example, Gucci America, Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., in which
Gucci claimed that a variety of Guess? products infringed its Re-
peating GG Pattern trade dress, which consisted of “a pair of inward
facing, inverted G’s set at the corners of a repeating, diamond-
shaped pattern connected by two dots forming straight diagonal
lines.”216 The “Diamond Motif Trade Dress [was] this pattern exe-
cuted on canvas in a brown/beige colorway, with pinpoint ‘shading’
within the Gs.”217
Clearly Guess?’s design shared some of those features, particu-
larly the use of a diamond-shaped pattern connected by Gs, canvas
execution in a brown/beige colorway, with pinpoint shading within
the Gs.218
214. See Beebe, supra note 183, at 1641-42.
215. See Richard Craswell, “Compared to What?” The Use of Control Ads in Deceptive Ad-
vertising Litigation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 757, 758 (2007).
216. 868 F. Supp. 2d 207, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Full disclosure: one of us (McKenna) worked
as an expert for Guess? in this case. His testimony did not relate to the consumer surveys in
the case but instead focused on a marketing report submitted by another expert, which offered
a theory of harm to Gucci from Guess?’s sales. 
217. Id. at 219.
218. See id. at 247.
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Figure 8.
Repeating GG Pattern (Gucci v. Guess?)
Gucci’s Repeating GG
Pattern/Diamond Motif Trade Dress
Guess?’s Quattro G Pattern
Thus, standing alone, the two designs no doubt look quite similar—
similar enough that one might be concerned about confusion. But
comparison of only these two designs would be highly misleading;
one or more of those features could be found in many other bags
that were on the market at the same time as Guess?’s. In particular,
other bags featured diamond-shaped patterns, canvas execution,
and/or the brown/beige colorway:
Figure 9.
Comparison of Bags Sharing Similar Features to Guess?’s Design
(Gucci v. Guess?)
Coach 2006 Christian Dior 2006 Dooney & Bourke
(since at least 2005)
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In spite of these coexisting designs, the court found “that there
[was] a likelihood of confusion between the Diamond Motif Trade
Dress and the Quattro G Pattern, when it [was] rendered in brown/
beige colorways.”219 That conclusion surely was influenced by the
court’s finding that Guess? had intentionally copied the Repeating
GG Pattern and the Diamond Motif Trade Dress, a finding that was
based on the fact that Guess? had sent its manufacturers copies of
the Gucci design and asked them to make the Guess? design simi-
lar.220 But the court also was influenced by a survey that perfectly
illustrates our concern.221 As shown in Figure 10, Gucci’s survey ex-
pert used as the test bag a version of an actual Guess? bag that was
modified to remove the central striped element, which Gucci sepa-
rately claimed as a trademark.222 The control, however, changed
virtually everything—the color, the orientation of the logos on the
bag, and even the design of the interlocking four G’s on Guess?’s bag
(which, incidentally, is the Guess? Quattro G trademark).223
Figure 10.
Gucci Expert Survey (Gucci v. Guess?)
Actual Guess? Bag Mantis Test Bag Mantis Control Bag
As it turned out, more people believed Gucci was the source of the
test bag than the control bag—a result that should surprise no one,
given how different the control bag looks.224 But there is no reason
219. Id. at 248.
220. See id. at 226-27.
221. See id. at 232-33.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. Remarkably, the court found infringement despite its conclusion that, combining
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to think any confusion regarding the source of the test bag was a
result of the protectable aspects of Gucci’s design. Indeed, it’s entire-
ly possible the respondents simply believed that Gucci is the source
of any bag with a brown/beige colorway and logos arranged diago-
nally.
Perhaps because they are cognizant of the difficulties of managing
scope at the infringement stage, courts’ concerns about scope some-
times affect their assessments of validity. In some trade dress cases,
courts have ratcheted up the secondary meaning requirement, de-
manding more than the sort of commercial success evidence they
routinely accept in word mark cases. In Yankee Candle, for example,
the court refused to recognize any rights in the common features of
Yankee’s candle labels, which it described as “essentially a combina-
tion of functional and common features,” and subjected them to a
rigorous secondary meaning analysis.225 This kind of concern even
works at the wholesale level, especially with regard to trade dress.
The Supreme Court’s Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.
decision, under which product configuration can never be considered
inherently distinctive, was based in part on the Court’s concerns
about overclaiming under a rule that allowed claims to proceed on
the basis of alleged inherent distinctiveness.226
In other cases, courts’ concerns about inability to appropriately
cabin a party’s rights lead them to declare the claimed trade dress
entirely invalid because the plaintiff seems to be overclaiming. In
Wallace International Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co.,
for example, the court refused to recognize rights in Wallace’s claim-
ed Baroque-style silverware design.227 It did so on the ground that
the design was aesthetically functional, but it seems clear to us that
the court believed the real problem was one of scope. According to
the court, “if Wallace [had been] able to show secondary meaning in
several surveys, the “maximum level of confusion amongst casual observers in the post-sale
setting” was just 5.8 percent. Id. at 232.
225. Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 42 (1st Cir. 2001); see also
id. at 44 (requiring more than “evidence of the pervasiveness of the trade dress,” noting that
anything less would “provide trade dress protection for any successful product”).
226. 529 U.S. 205, 213-14 (2000) (noting the lack of clarity in tests of inherent distinc-
tiveness and the “unlikelihood of inherently source-identifying design” and therefore declaring
inherent distinctiveness for product design “not worth the candle”).
227. 916 F.2d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Knitwaves, Inc. v.
Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995).
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a precise expression of baroque style, competitors might [have been]
excluded from using an identical or virtually identical design.”228 In
other words, at the level of “Baroque-style silverware,” Wallace’s de-
sign did not have secondary meaning, and allowing Wallace to claim
rights at that level would have enabled it to capture designs desired
by consumers primarily for their aesthetic value rather than their
source designation.229 If Wallace had claimed narrowly, both prob-
lems might have been averted. But since Wallace either would not
or could not do so, it had no rights at all.
While, as these cases suggest, courts in trademark cases are
sometimes unwilling to recognize any trademark rights when they
are concerned about scope, in other cases courts are more comfort-
able finding noninfringement. That is particularly so when the tool
for finding invalidity strikes courts as cutting too broadly, since they
understand the relevant invalidity doctrine (most often, functional-
ity) to render the claimed mark unenforceable in any case. 
Particularly in aesthetic functionality cases, courts have some-
times been reluctant to invalidate the mark altogether. In Loubout-
in v. Yves Saint Laurent, for example, the Second Circuit seemed to
recognize that consumers might want, and competitors might there-
fore need, red-soled shoes for non-source-related reasons.230 But
rather than finding the red soles unprotectable on that basis, the
court fumbled around, suggesting that aesthetic functionality could
be considered only after resolving all other issues of protectability
and confusion,231 and only through a “fact-specific” inquiry and nev-
er by “a per se rule.”232 The court then dodged the question entirely
by construing Louboutin’s mark narrowly to cover only contrasting
red outsoles and not all-red shoes like those Yves Saint Laurent
sold.233 Rather than invalidating the mark, it limited the scope of
Louboutin’s rights and found noninfringement.234 
But unlike Louboutin, in which the court found another route to
deny recovery to the plaintiff, in many cases courts’ concerns about
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206,
227-28 (2d Cir. 2012).
231. See id. at 216-17.
232. Id. at 222-23.
233. See id. at 228.
234. See id.
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the consequences of using validity doctrines leave them without
a tool even to avoid enforcement against a particular defendant
who has not done anything the law legitimately prohibits. In Au-
Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., for example, the
defendant wanted to use the Volkswagen (VW) logo on key chains
and license plate covers, which it plausibly contended consumers
wanted to match their cars.235 Though the court acknowledged that
this was possible, it could not bring itself to find that the VW logos
were functional, largely because it felt that finding would compel
the conclusion that VW owned no rights in the VW logos for any
purposes, including when used to designate the source of Volks-
wagen’s vehicles.236 Thus, the court found the defendant liable for a
use that trademark law should not prohibit because the tool it had
available swept too broadly.237
Similarly, in Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., the Fourth Circuit
held that Google could face trademark liability for the automatic op-
eration of its AdWords feature, which showed people ads they might
be interested in based on the search terms they typed into Google.238
The district court held that while Google technically “used” the
mark, its use was a functional one—for the purpose of returning an
automated result.239 But the Fourth Circuit rejected that conclusion,
deciding that the tool the district court used to achieve that end—
functionality—was an all-or-nothing validity rule and could not be
235. See 457 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006).
236. See id. at 1067 (“Consumers sometimes buy products bearing marks such as the Nike
Swoosh, the Playboy bunny ears, the Mercedes tri-point star, the Ferrari stallion, and count-
less sports franchise logos, for the appeal of the mark itself, without regard to whether it
signifies the origin or sponsorship of the product.”).
237. One of us has previously argued that aesthetic functionality need not have this all-or-
nothing character—that courts could find that particular uses were for their aesthetic
function and thereby insulate the defendant from liability without declaring the mark entirely
invalid. See McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 53; McKenna, supra note 97; cf. Justin
Hughes, Cognitive and Aesthetic Functionality in Trademark Law, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227,
1230 (2015) (arguing that aesthetic functionality is better understood as an effort to deny
trademark owners control over features that provoke a cognitive or psychological response in
consumers). Lemley has argued that such uses (for nontrademark purposes) should be deemed
noninfringing because only trademark uses can infringe. See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra
note 94. Although these arguments differ in some important respects, both are efforts to
delineate the scope of trademark rights for marks that pass the validity threshold.
238. 676 F.3d 144, 156 (4th Cir. 2012).
239. See id. at 153; cf. Hughes, supra note 237, at 1230.
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used to calibrate the scope of Rosetta Stone’s rights in its mark.240
Similarly, in Fleischer Studios, the Ninth Circuit originally held
that a defendant could not be liable for putting a picture of Betty
Boop on shirts because it was merely using the image of Betty Boop
and not the trademark as such, and trademark law is not supposed
to give ownership over the image itself.241 The court subsequently
reversed itself, however, again concluding that the tool on which it
had previously relied—the functionality doctrine—could not be used
to calibrate the proper scope of the plaintiff’s right.242
We have argued elsewhere that trademark law has expanded
inappropriately in various respects and is in need of limiting prin-
ciples.243 One of the reasons courts find liability in cases that extend
well beyond the proper scope of trademark rights is that the limiting
doctrines that are available turn out to be all-or-nothing validity
doctrines. Courts are (properly) reluctant to invalidate a plaintiff ’s
mark altogether, and they are unwilling or unable to limit the scope
of that mark in cases where it has been asserted against a defen-
dant that is not doing something the law actually forbids.
4. Design Patent 
Unlike utility patents, design patents are supposed to protect
only the ornamental features of a design, not the functional as-
pects that make the device work better.244 If a design patent owner
tries to assert control over a functional aspect of the design, she is
240. See Rosetta Stone, 676 F.3d at 162 (“Once it is determined that the product feature—
the word mark ROSETTA STONE in this case—is not functional, then the functionality doc-
trine has no application, and it is irrelevant whether Google’s computer program functions.”).
241. See Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011),
rev’d on reh’g, 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011).
242. See Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 2011). For
a general discussion on the Betty Boop case, see Irene Calboli, Betty Boop and the Return of
Aesthetic Functionality: A Bitter Medicine Against “Mutant Copyrights”?, 36 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 80 (2014).
243. See generally Lemley & McKenna, supra note 67.
244. See PHG Techs., LLC v. St. John Cos., 469 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Unlike
trademark law, which is designed to protect identifications of source, design patent is intend-
ed to protect aesthetics directly. So, there is no aesthetic functionality doctrine in design
patent as there is in trademark. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Design Protection and the New
Technologies: The United States Experience in a Transnational Perspective, 19 U. BALT. L.
REV. 6, 8-10 (1989); Michael Risch, Functionality and Graphical User Interface Design Patents,
17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 53, 55 (2013).
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improperly seeking to expand the scope of her right beyond what the
law is supposed to give.
One scope problem with design patents parallels the one just dis-
cussed in trademarks: functionality. The functionality doctrine is
intended to stop this sort of overreaching. Unfortunately, it is not up
to the task. Because functionality is a validity doctrine, not an
infringement doctrine or a defense, a finding that a design patent is
functional means no protection at all for the design, even for its
ornamental features.245 Courts, unwilling to invalidate a design al-
together merely because part of the designed device is functional,
have responded by narrowing the design patent functionality doc-
trine almost to the point of nonexistence.246 In design patent law, a
design is functional—and thus unprotectable—only if there is no
other possible way to achieve the same result.247 And a functional
design is unprotectable only if it is “governed solely by function.”248
Needless to say, that almost never happens.249 But if the design is
treated as nonfunctional for validity purposes, the fact that it does
function is then ignored when it comes to infringement and defens-
es, because functionality is a validity doctrine, not an infringement
doctrine. The result is that it is all too possible that a design patent
owner can capture scope she was never meant to have, preventing
her competitors from copying functional rather than ornamental
features of a product.250 
245. See Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234, 238 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
246. See Mark P. McKenna & Katherine J. Strandburg, Progress and Competition in
Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013); Risch, supra note 244, at 54.
247. See, e.g., Seiko Epson Corp. v. Nu-Kote Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(holding that a design is functional only if it is “the only possible form of the article that could
perform its function”); L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir.
1993); Avia Grp. Int’l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988). This
is a much narrower standard than functionality in trademark law, which prevents protection
if something affects the cost or quality of the article being sold. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v.
Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001). 
248. Seiko Epson, 190 F.3d at 1368; see In re Carletti, 328 F.2d 1020, 1022 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
249. For a discussion of the few cases invalidating design patents on functionality grounds
in recent years, see Risch, supra note 244, at 92.
250. See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 672, 682-83 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(en banc). The prior test had permitted a defendant to avoid infringement if he could show
that he used only the unprotectable elements of the design. See Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.,
838 F.2d 1186, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The “ordinary observer” test does not seem to
contemplate such a “practicing the functional art” defense.
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We could solve that problem at the infringement stage if we
applied functionality—or something like it—as a legal scope filter
to ensure that defendants were not held liable based on similarities
of functional rather than ornamental features. But in fact the
functionality problem is compounded by a second gap in scope—the
test for infringement. The basic test for infringement of a design
patent is the “ordinary observer” test, which assesses “whether an
ordinary observer, familiar with the prior art, would be deceived
into thinking that the accused design was the same as the patented
design.”251 But that test has long been supplemented by a require-
ment that the defendant have appropriated the thing that makes
the design new and different from the prior art.252 If the defendant’s
use didn’t include the novel feature(s) in the patentee’s design, it
couldn’t infringe.253
In 2008, in Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa, the Federal Circuit
changed the law of design patents to eliminate the point-of-novelty
test for infringement.254 Instead, the court said, the focus must be on
the overall appearance of the design as a whole, not on “small differ-
ences” at the point of novelty.255 Novelty still matters, but now only
as a defense that must generally be assessed separately from in-
fringement.256 And subsequent Federal Circuit cases have used
Egyptian Goddess as precedent in concluding that point of novelty
is no longer the test for the invalidity of a design patent either.257
251. Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 672.
252. See id. at 670-71.
253. Portions of these three paragraphs are adapted from Lemley, supra note 24, at 1270-
71.
254. 543 F.3d at 678.
255. Id. at 677.
256. See id. at 678. The court did, however, take some steps to try to sneak back in the
prior art comparison it had just rejected, declaring that the ordinary observer was henceforth
one who was “familiar with the prior art.” Id. at 681. But the separation of the infringement
and validity inquiries creates an even bigger problem here than it does in utility patent law.
To infringe a utility patent, the defendant must include every element of the patented claim,
and so must necessarily include the thing that makes the invention patentable. After Egyp-
tian Goddess, by contrast, design patent law no longer has such a requirement. A design
patent can now be infringed even by a product that lacks the new feature encompassed by the
patent as long as an ordinary observer would think the two were substantially the same
overall. 
257. See, e.g., Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1237-38 (Fed.
Cir. 2009). For a discussion of this extension, see Marta Kowalczyk, Design Patent Infringe-
ment: Post-Egyptian Goddess, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 250-56.
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As long as an ordinary observer would find the design of the
accused product substantially the same as the patented design, the
fact that such a conclusion is driven by similarities in features that
already exist in the prior art doesn’t defeat a finding of infringe-
ment. It might or might not create a defense that the patent is
invalid for anticipation, though again that seems to depend on what
an ordinary observer would think when comparing the patented de-
sign and the prior art.258 And in any event that defense is evaluated
in isolation from infringement, not as part of an integrated analysis
of the proper scope of the design patent.
258. See Int’l Seaway, 589 F.3d at 1238. The Federal Circuit backed off that “ordinary
observer” test in favor of obviousness, which seems inconsistent with KSR International Co.
v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007), and High Point Design LLC v. Buyers Direct, Inc.,
730 F.3d 1301, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that the standard for obviousness was the or-
dinary designer, not the ordinary observer). Because the ordinary designer is presumably
more knowledgeable about design than the ordinary observer, the result of this change may
be to render more design patents invalid, though the obviousness standard is problematic in
other respects. 
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Figure 11.
Comparison of the Prior Art, Apple iPad, and Samsung Tablets
(Apple v. Samsung)
Prior Art 1 Prior Art 2
Apple iPad Samsung Tablet
To see the difference, consider the Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec-
tronics Co. litigation.259 Apple’s design patent for the iPad is on the
bottom left; Samsung’s accused tablet is on the bottom right. An
infringement analysis conducted in isolation asks whether an
ordinary observer would consider the Samsung design too close to
the patented one.260 In fact, however, Apple is not the first to come
up with a computer tablet that is square with rounded corners.261
The top two images in Figure 11 are in the prior art. A comparison
that includes the prior art would emphasize the narrowness of what
Apple contributed to the design and ask whether Samsung appropri-
ated whatever Apple’s patent added to the prior art. The move away
from that integrated scope question to the ordinary observer ques-
tion creates a gap—a risk that Apple will prevail because the jury
259. See 678 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
260. See id. at 1320.
261. See id. at 1329-30.
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finds similarity in the parts of the Apple design that are not pro-
tectable: the things Apple took from the prior art. At the very least,
it puts a great deal of reliance on the jury to use their presumed
“familiarity with the prior art” to implicitly exclude from consider-
ation of similarity features that do not owe their origin to Apple.
Similarly, in Prestige Jewelry International, Inc. v. BK Jewellry
HK, BK’s patented design featured a “relatively large full-cut center
diamond” that was tightly surrounded by “nine peripheral single-cut
diamonds.”262 BK alleged that Prestige infringed its design by sell-
ing the Unity cluster-top jewelry products, one version of which
“featured a full-cut center diamond surrounded by eight or ten
relatively smaller single-cut diamonds.”263
Figure 12.
Unity Images (Prestige Jewelry v. BK Jewellry )
BK was, of course, not the first one to make jewelry with a larger
diamond surrounded by smaller diamonds. One piece of prior art
(“the Lin Patent”), for example, disclosed a larger center diamond
surrounded by eight smaller, full-cut diamonds.
262. No. 1:11-cv-02930-LAP-DCF, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2014) (Sept. 15, 2014 order deny-
ing summary judgment). “Full-cut diamonds have more facets than single-cut diamonds and
typically produce a greater sparkling effect.” Id. at *5.
263. Id. at *10. Prestige also sold a version of the Unity jewelry that included only full-cut
diamonds. 
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Figure 13.
The Lin Patent No. 7,762,104 (Prestige Jewelry v. BK Jewelry)
Another piece of prior art, the “Edwardian cluster ring,” “included
nine peripheral stones and was practiced at least as early as the
Edwardian era, approximately 1901-1915.”264 A proper assessment
of BK’s design would have focused particularly on the use of a rela-
tively larger center diamond surrounded by nine smaller peripheral
single-cut diamonds. That Prestige surrounded a larger central dia-
mond with eight or ten (or even nine) smaller peripheral diamonds
ought not be enough to say it is infringing. But the court expressly
refused to identify the point of novelty, assuming the jury could see
for itself the novel features of the design and know not to credit
similarities in anything but those novel features.265 We seriously
doubt that.
A final potential scope gap in design patents involves the asser-
tion of design patents against uses of the design on different prod-
ucts than the plaintiff expected. The design patent claim takes the
form of an image. That image is normally representative of a prod-
uct, but increasingly it is an image or an icon or brand that could be
applied to a product.266 When the defendant uses the image in a
completely different context (say, reproducing the design in a book
or using it on a bumper sticker), the question is properly whether
264. Id. at *14.
265. See id. at *30-31.
266. See, e.g., Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, Virtual Designs, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
107, 109 (2013). For an argument that design patents should not be extended beyond the
shape of a specific type of product to images that can be applied to other objects, see generally
Sarah Burstein, The Patented Design, 83 TENN. L. REV. 161 (2015).
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the defendant’s use is within the lawful scope of the design patent.
But is that a question of validity or one of infringement? Design
patent law thinks about the issue as one of validity—is a patent
appropriately limited to application to a product? But it is perhaps
more plausibly a scope question. The problem with Apple suing
someone who puts their logo on a bumper sticker isn’t that the logo
patent is invalid, but that they are using that patent to control
behavior over which we don’t want to give them control, just as we
don’t want to give Volkswagen the right to control the making of
keychains. Without a way of calibrating the scope of the design
patent, we are left with a choice between invalidating the patent
altogether or allowing the IP owner to prevent a use that design
patent law was never intended to prevent.267 
Allowing enforcement of a design patent against these kinds of
uses would also run afoul of the maxim that “[t]hat which infringes,
if later, would anticipate, if earlier.”268 In design patent law, “[t]he
scope of the prior art is not the universe of abstract design and
artistic creativity, but designs of the same article of manufacture or
of articles sufficiently similar that a person of ordinary skill would
look to such articles for their designs.”269 Under that standard, a
bumper sticker is unlikely to count as relevant prior art against a
GUI design. Yet if the design patent isn’t field-limited, then it’s no
longer true that that which infringes if later would invalidate if
earlier. The scope of the design patent on the infringement side is
no longer constrained by what differentiates the invention from the
prior art.
III. TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED DOCTRINE OF IP SCOPE
A. The Need for an Integrated Scope Determination
What all of the examples in Part II have in common is a discon-
nect between legal doctrines that allows an IP owner to claim some-
thing that the law should not—and indeed purports not to—give
267. For an argument that design patents should not extend to representations of the
design or its use on different products than the patentee’s, see Burstein, supra note 266.
268. Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(alteration in original) (quoting Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889)).
269. Hupp v. Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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her. The proper scope of an IP right is not set by some god or dic-
tated by immutable natural law. It is a function of the purposes of
the IP regime, what the IP claimant has contributed to the world,
and the uses that must remain open in order that the IP regime not
unduly interfere with social welfare.270 The point of complex validity
rules, infringement rules, and defenses is to get as close as possible
to that proper scope.
Because the law has separated validity, infringement, and de-
fenses, generally considering each of them in isolation from the
others, IP owners can and regularly do seek to expand the scope of
their IP rights beyond permissible bounds. The law sometimes
reacts by invalidating the IP right altogether because of the over-
breadth of the plaintiff ’s claim. But courts and especially juries tend
to be reluctant to strike down an IP right altogether for overclaim-
ing.271 And even though invalidating the right can be the better of
the two options available to the court, that result is often not ideal,
since invalidating the right means that it cannot be asserted even
against infringements that are concededly within the proper, more
limited scope of the IP right.
The separation of validity, infringement, and defenses has turned
IP litigation into something akin to a game of blackjack. Whatever
the hand the IP owner has been dealt, they have an incentive to add
to it—increase the scope of the right—as much as possible. But if
they go too far—over twenty-one—the entire hand is thrown out.
Whatever the merits of blackjack as a card game, it is not a reliable
way to get IP regimes to produce the right answer, for it often leads
to over- or underinclusive rights.
IP law needs a way to expressly consider scope in a single,
integrated proceeding. Courts should coordinate validity, infringe-
ment, and defense proceedings in some way so that both the fact of
overreaching and its potential consequences become clear to the
parties and the court before trial. Our aim should be to find the
proper scope for an IP right. And that can’t be done if we consider
validity, infringement, and defenses in isolation. Courts must be
willing to think about these doctrines in an integrated fashion.
270. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 67, at 183-84.
271. See Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (reasoning that “claims
should be construed to sustain their validity” if possible).
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That, in turn, means they will have to understand and confront the
purposes of the IP doctrines, rather than viewing those doctrines as
rules to follow wherever they might lead. 
We think many of copyright and trademark law’s current features
are a consequence of the lack of an integrated scope mechanism.
Existing doctrines reflect tradeoffs between validity, infringement,
and defenses as mechanisms to manage scope. Patent law chooses
a high bar for validity, and Markman hearings set a defined mean-
ing that controls at the infringement stage.272 As a result, patent
law has less work to do to manage scope at the infringement stage,
and it has relatively less need for defenses. Copyright is at the oth-
er end of the spectrum, setting a low bar for validity and punting
the great majority of scope management to infringement, defenses,
and exceptions. Trademark is in between, but closer to copyright
than to patent: it has some true validity doctrines, but it still tries
to manage scope at the infringement stage much more than patent.
This means that copyright and trademark have a tendency to hand
many important scope questions to the jury.273 
That allocation would be fine if we thought courts had good tools
for managing scope at the later stages of a case. But they don’t. In
copyright cases, courts do analytic dissection for purposes of deter-
mining copying but not for purposes of infringement.274 Trademark
law doesn’t even have (explicitly at least) anything analogous to
analytic dissection; it simply counts on the likelihood of confusion
factors to set the scope.275 And although these doctrinal structures
can and do generate errors in both directions, we think they more
commonly result in overbroad protection for works and trademarks
that deserve only very narrow protection, if any. 
B. Markman as a Scope Proceeding
There is one area of modern IP law that treats scope in a more-or-
less integrated way: utility patent law. For the past twenty years,
patent cases have included a pretrial proceeding in which the courts
272. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996).
273. See generally Balganesh et al., supra note 155 (discussing the different questions an-
swered by judges and juries during copyright trials).
274. See Lemley, supra note 112, at 736-38.
275. See supra Part II.C.3.
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construe the claims of the patent, defining what the legal definition
of the patent is—and therefore what the patent does and does not
cover—in the specific context of the dispute between the parties.
These so-called Markman hearings do what virtually no other IP
proceeding does: they define the breadth of the patent right in a way
that is thereafter used for both validity and infringement.276 In
theory, therefore, they prevent the nose of wax problem that has
beset assessments of scope in IP law.
Markman hearings frequently result in summary judgment for
one side or the other—once the court has decided the proper scope
of the patent, it is rare that there is a factual dispute as to whether
the defendant has infringed the patent.277 And while post-Markman
disputes about validity are more common, many of those can be
resolved once the court has decided what the patent claim does and
does not cover. Further, the advent of Markman hearings led direct-
ly to the closing of one scope gap—the temporal difference between
patent validity and patent infringement. Before Markman, courts
assessed patent validity based on how the claim would be under-
stood as of the time of invention, or perhaps the filing date, but as-
sessed infringement based on the understanding of the term as of
the date of infringement.278 But once courts started construing claim
terms in a single integrated proceeding, they rebelled against the
idea that the same claim should have different meanings at dif-
ferent times.279
Markman hearings are not by any means a perfect expression of
the scope principle. In particular, there are two problems in practice
with Markman hearings as scope vehicles. First, although courts
are supposed to construe claims to preserve their validity where pos-
sible,280 the Federal Circuit has discouraged courts from thinking
about the validity of the claims at all when deciding the meaning of
276. Named for Markman, 517 U.S. at 370, 384-87, which created them. There are few
substantive defenses in patent law apart from invalidity, but when they come into play, they
too are governed by the definition of the invention set out in the Markman proceeding.
277. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 958 (2007).
278. See Lemley, supra note 8, at 105-10. 
279. See id. at 110-11. Lemley endorses this integrated approach. See id. at 112-15.
280. See, e.g., Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that claims
should be so construed, if possible, as to sustain their validity).
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the claim terms at issue in the case.281 This is an instance of the “dif-
ferent decisionmakers” problem.282 Courts seem unwilling to assess
validity pretrial because it is (sometimes) an issue for the jury at
trial.283 The result is that, even at Markman hearings, patentees
may seek to unduly broaden the scope of the patent and take their
chances later on with invalidity. The situation is still better than it
would be without the hearing, because the claim is given a single
scope for both validity and infringement purposes. But it does not
avoid the blackjack problem altogether.
Second, Markman hearings focus on the words of the claims
written by patent lawyers to try to define the invention rather than
on the invention itself.284 As one of us has argued elsewhere, allow-
ing words about inventions to become the focus rather than the
inventions themselves has led to a variety of mischief, from making
overclaiming easier to introducing ambiguities in the scope of the
patent that have nothing to do with what the patentee actually
invented, but only with uncertainty in the meaning of the words
chosen to describe them.285 And this has also had the perverse effect
of dividing—rather than unifying—the analysis of a patent claim,
focusing on short phrases and individual words rather than the
claim as a whole. The result has arguably been to “fraction” patent
law, throwing up a large number of hurdles to the patentee rather
than evaluating the scope of the claims as an integrated whole.286
But these failures of the Markman process should not overshadow
its central promise: getting the court to think about the scope of the
patent right, rather than just whether it is valid or infringed. So
while we strongly disagree with Larry Solum and TJ Chiang that
there is anything like an acceptable amount of certainty in the
meaning we assign to words in claim construction,287 we very much
281. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (dis-
missing that canon as one “of limited utility in any event” and saying that “we have not
applied that principle broadly”).
282. See supra Part II.B.1.
283. For an argument that validity should not necessarily go to the jury, see generally
Lemley, supra note 72 (explaining that jury decisions on the validity of patents are a
relatively new phenomenon and something unique to the American court system).
284. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 10, at 1744.
285. See id. at 1762.
286. See Mark A. Lemley, The Fractioning of Patent Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE COMMON LAW 504, 509 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013).
287. See generally Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction
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agree that the Markman hearing is at its base a dispute about the
scope of the legal right being granted, not simply about the mean-
ing of words. That’s why claim construction failed when courts tried
to do it in a vacuum, without the context of the accused device.288 
And unlike any other area of IP law, patent law for the past
twenty years has set out to establish that scope directly, rather than
just applying legal doctrines that depend on an implicit and chang-
ing assumption about the scope of the patent. Although Markman
hearings have focused on the wrong mechanism for measuring
scope—the words used by lawyers to describe the invention, rather
than the invention itself—they are at least trying to determine the
scope of the invention in a single proceeding.
C. Adapting the Scope Proceeding for Other IP Rights
Copyright, trademark, and design patent should seek to emulate
patent law in adopting an integrated, pretrial determination of the
proper scope of the IP right. This doesn’t mean these other areas of
IP should adopt claims or claim construction verbatim.289 Copyrights
Distinction in Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. 530, 534 (2013) (arguing that “uncertainty in claim
application most typically arises because judges have core policy disagreements about the
underlying goals of claim construction” rather than because judges acknowledge different
linguistic meanings). As Zahr Said points out, it may be the very transparency into the scope
determination that Markman provides that makes the uncertainty of the process apparent.
See Said, supra note 8, at 519-20. Copyright and trademark scope determinations are no more
certain; we may simply not see the uncertainty because we don’t think expressly about scope
at all.
For a different critique of Chiang and Solum, see generally Camilla Hrdy & Ben V.
Picozzi, Claim Construction or Statutory Construction? A Response to Chiang & Solum, 124
YALE L.J. F. 208 (2014), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/claim-construction-or-statutory-
construction [https://perma.cc/G6YF-D49W]; Oskar Liivak, The Unresolved Interpretive
Ambiguity of Patent Claims: A Response to Solum and Chiang 1-7 (Feb. 3, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2559958 [https://perma.cc/DC53-QWF5].
288. Compare Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (de-
scribing claim construction as a legal question that could be resolved in the abstract), with
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(rejecting the Vitronics approach: “[T]he legal function of giving meaning to claim terms
always takes place in the context of a specific accused infringing device or process....
[K]nowledge of that product or process provides meaningful context for the first step of the
infringement analysis.”). Most courts follow Wilson Sporting Goods today. See, e.g., Kaneka
Corp. v. Xiamen Kingdomway Grp. Co., 790 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
289. Jeanne Fromer argues that copyright law already has a de facto system of claiming,
though it operates centrally rather than peripherally and by example rather than by char-
acteristic. See Fromer, supra note 13, at 721. But she resists the idea of building a claiming
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and trademarks typically don’t have claims at all,290 and design pat-
ents have visual claims that aren’t necessarily suitable to the sort
of verbal clarification that is the heart of the Markman hearing.291
Utility patent law also has some structural advantages that make
it especially well suited to the kind of integrated scope proceeding
we described. By comparison to copyright and trademark, and even
by comparison to design patent, utility patent law has a relatively
high bar for validity, and courts therefore don’t have to work as
hard to manage scope at the infringement. Certainly there are
important questions in patent cases about the meaning of the
claims, and as we argued above, that scope determination can’t be
disentangled from infringement. But patent law has the significant
advantage of the “all elements” rule, under which an accused in-
vention infringes only if it contains every element of the claimed
invention.292 That rule necessarily draws a factfinder’s attention to
each and every limitation of the claim in a way that copyright and
trademark law’s infringement rules do not. And because the patent
infringement standard requires identity between the accused device
and the claimed elements of the patented invention, it’s relatively
easy to determine infringement once we know the meaning of the
claims.293 Both copyright and trademark law are more expansive
here in that the defendant’s work or mark can be more dissimilar
and still be infringing. As a result, copyright and trademark still
procedure more explicitly into copyright law. See id. at 793-94.
290. We say “typically” because several circuits now require a trade dress claimant to
identify the particular elements of the claimed trade dress. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 415 (6th Cir. 2006) (“In requiring a list of discrete elements,
we are looking to avoid vague and indeterminate references to the overall appearance or look
of plaintiff ’s packaging.”); Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 116-17 (2d Cir.
2001) (“[W]e hold that a plaintiff seeking to protect its trade dress in a line of products must
articulate the design elements that compose the trade dress.”).
291. See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. 543 F.3d 665, 679-80 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(rejecting the need for a verbal claim construction of a visual claim in a design patent case).
As the Supreme Court has explained, a design patent claim “is better represented by [an]
illustration than it could be by any description, and a description would probably not be
intelligible without the illustration.” Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 14 (1886).
292. The doctrine of equivalents obviously loosens this requirement a bit, but the Supreme
Court has constrained that doctrine too, requiring equivalency with respect to each claim
element. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997). And
as we note below, the doctrine of equivalents also builds on another scope doctrine by
prohibiting parties from claiming equivalents that cover the prior art.
293. See id. at 35.
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have more work to do after determining the protectable aspects of
the plaintiff ’s property. 
Nevertheless, we think courts should have an opportunity to
assess the proper legal scope of copyrights, trademarks, and design
patents, just as they do patents. Defining the scope of the IP right
is critical for assessing all aspects of the case, and it is something
that is best done by the judge before the substantive merits of the
case are resolved. The most straightforward way to assess that
scope is by identifying in a clear way what aspects of the IP right
are protectable. Most importantly, the scope determination must be
done in an integrated proceeding that considers what the plaintiff
is entitled to claim as well as the differences between the plaintiff ’s
and defendant’s products and any available defenses. And that pro-
ceeding must happen before a judge, not a jury, except in rare cases.
Only a judge is equipped to evaluate the full range of legal doctrines
that determine the scope of an IP right.294
That doesn’t mean we would take all infringement or validity
issues away from the jury, even if we could. Rather, the point is that
before courts give one of those issues to the jury—or even resolve it
in isolation on a summary judgment motion—they need to engage
in a reality check to make sure that the thing that might allow a
factfinder to find infringement is something the law protects. Such
a determination shouldn’t be delegated to a jury unversed in the
tradeoffs inherent to the IP system.
There are examples outside the Markman context of courts en-
gaging in this kind of integrated scope analysis. The doctrine of
equivalents in utility patent law has an integrated scope doctrine of
294. In an important article, Zahr Said argues for an interpretive regime in copyright akin
to patent’s Markman hearing. See Said, supra note 8, at 473-74. She affirmatively counsels
that courts take a formalist approach to interpreting the scope of copyrights, arguing that
doing so will “offer[ ] defendants a more predictable and streamlined way to cut off litigation
pre-trial.” Id. at 519. We are more skeptical than Said about the virtues or workability of
formalism in a fact-bound area like copyright. But we do think she is on the right track to
suggest a pretrial interpretive hearing before a judge in which the court has the power to
determine the scope of the copyright in an integrated fashion. While it is theoretically true
that integrating the entire proceeding before the jury could have the same effect, we don’t
think juries are sufficiently versed in the legal rules that they could make a scope deter-
mination properly. They would also not make it transparently, which would make it difficult
for an appellate court to review the scope assessment. And in any event, the rules of copyright
and trademark currently preclude giving the jury the sorts of information they would need
to make an informed scope decision.
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a sort in the “prior art” defense. While, as we have seen, practicing
the prior art is no defense to a claim of literal patent infringement,
it is a defense to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.295
The doctrine of equivalents creates a sort of penumbra around the
scope of the patent claim, allowing patentees to sue people who
make products that are only insubstantially different from the pat-
ented invention.296 But the doctrine of equivalents does not permit
a patentee to use the doctrine to expand the scope of her claims to
such an extent that it would cover things in the prior art. To avoid
that problem, patent courts will construct a “hypothetical claim”
that would cover the defendant’s product, and ask whether that
hypothetical claim would also cover items in the prior art.297 If it
would, the patentee is overclaiming and the effort to apply the doc-
trine of equivalents is rejected.298 The prior art defense in patent’s
doctrine of equivalents offers an example of an explicit scope deci-
sion that is nonetheless something short of a full-blown Markman
hearing.
While we don’t suggest written claims for copyrights, trademarks,
or design patents (and we even worry about how well they work
with utility patents), we think courts will often have to express in
words exactly what is different and protectable about the IP right.299
Doing so will often occur in connection with a motion for summary
judgment, though we would be more comfortable with a separate
proceeding, as in patent law, because validity and infringement
often won’t both come before the court on summary judgment. But
295. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 683-85 (Fed.
Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S.
83 (1993).
296. On the doctrine of equivalents in patent law, see Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731-34 (2002); Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 21; Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-09 (1950).
297. See Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684.
298. See id. at 685.
299. Some have expressed to us the concern that dissecting and describing the works can
miss the heart of the similarities between them. That is clearly the motivation behind the
“total look and feel” approach. But we worry that the law errs too much in the opposite di-
rection, protecting an amorphous look and feel, see Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co.,
429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970), even when the things that make a work seem similar are
not the things IP law intends to protect. IP owners should be able to demonstrate a syner-
gistic combination of known elements in appropriate cases, but that cannot be an excuse for
simply handing the two works to the jury with no guidance as to what can and cannot con-
stitute infringement.
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even if a jury must resolve a factual issue, courts should be commu-
nicating clearly to juries which similarities can—or, as might be
easier in many cases, cannot—be the basis for a finding of infringe-
ment.
Sometimes, though, a picture is worth a thousand words.300 Until
recently, design patent law had a rather straightforward effort to
close the scope gap that did not require an explicit written scope
definition: courts would line up the patented design, the accused
product, and the closest piece of prior art next to each other.301
Showing infringement of a valid design patent required persuading
a single factfinder that the defendant’s product was more like the
patent than it was like the prior art. If it was more like the prior
art, the patentee was improperly extending her right by suing the
defendant. This simple artifice allowed a factfinder to easily see
efforts to overclaim the scope of a design patent right in ways that
might tread on the prior art.302 It wasn’t perfect, because visual
images left to “speak for themselves” can sometimes mislead.303
Thus, we may sometimes want to require the parties to articulate
what is different about the visual works the court is comparing in
order to make sure that the asserted novelty of the plaintiff ’s work
(or the asserted similarity of the defendant’s) is in fact something
we want the law to protect. Still, having both the accused product
and the prior art together in a room was a good start.304
300. Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 683, 703-04 (2012).
301. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 527 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Applied Arts Corp. v. Grand Rapids Metalcraft Corp., 67 F.2d 428, 430 (6th Cir. 1933).
302. See Rebecca Tushnet, The Eye Alone Is the Judge: Images and Design Patents, 19 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 409, 411 (2012) (“Many designs involve non-novel or functional features, and
are only protectable because of other novel features, or because of a novel combination of
otherwise familiar features. But if the overall effect of the design on the eye is the measure
of infringement, how are factfinders to avoid potentially broadening the scope of the design
patent too far when an accused design looks like a patented design because of similarities in
these unprotectable features?”).
303. For discussions of the difficulties courts have in evaluating nonwritten works in IP,
see, for example, Jessica Silbey, Evidence Verité and the Law of Film, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
1257, 1280-81 (2010); Jessica M. Silbey, Judges as Film Critics: New Approaches to Filmic Ev-
idence, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 508-09, 554-57 (2004); Tushnet, supra note 300, at 696,
697 & n.94. As we noted above, the “Blurred Lines” copyright case may be an example of this.
304. We acknowledge that this approach was especially challenging in cases in which the
claimed design incorporated features of several prior designs, because a court then couldn’t
simply identify a single piece of prior art as the “closest.” But we think the instinct was right,
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Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit abolished this test in 2009,
replacing it with an “ordinary observer” test that further separated
validity from infringement and asked the factfinder deciding in-
fringement to compare only the defendant’s product and the
patented design. In theory this comparison is done by an ordinary
observer “familiar with the prior art”—meaning that comparisons
between the claimed design and the prior art would still be relevant
under the ordinary observer test.305 But it is now up to the defen-
dant to frame any such comparisons, as the factfinder will not have
the benefit of the court identifying particularly the features that
differentiate the claimed design from that prior art. In the Prestige
Jewelry case, for example, the district court refused to characterize
the patented design at all, suggesting that “[a] jury can count the
number of peripheral diamonds and observe that the peripheral
diamonds are smaller than the center diamond. A jury also can
easily observe that the peripheral diamonds have a different cut
from the center diamond.”306 In fact, the court was concerned that
“[t]ranslating the ‘132 Patent’s drawing into words would not be
helpful to the jury and might lead a jury to fixate too much on
specific elements such as cut and count”—even though it was clear
that cut and count were precisely the things that differentiated the
patented design from the prior art.307 
and that having even a few pieces of prior art as part of the comparison would often have been
manageable.
305. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Our re-
jection of the point of novelty test does not mean, of course, that the differences between the
claimed design and prior art designs are irrelevant. To the contrary, examining the novel
features of the claimed design can be an important component of the comparison of the
claimed design with the accused design and the prior art. But the comparison of the designs,
including the examination of any novel features, must be conducted as part of the ordinary
observer test, not as part of a separate test focusing on particular points of novelty that are
designated only in the course of litigation.”).
306. Prestige Jewelry Int’l, Inc. v. BK Jewellery HK, No. 1:11-cv-02930-LAP-DCF, at *30
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2015) (Sept. 15, 2014 order denying summary judgment).
307. Id. In International Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., the Federal Circuit
extended the ordinary observer test (and its rejection of the point of novelty) to the antici-
pation context. See 589 F.3d 1233, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The court said that novelty would
be assessed by comparing the claimed invention to the allegedly-anticipating prior art refer-
ence from the perspective of an ordinary observer familiar with the prior art (in that context,
art prior to the prior art reference). See id. at 1238-39. Yet without even mentioning a single
reference that predated the prior art reference, the court had no trouble concluding that cer-
tain elements of the claimed design were “distinctly different” from the prior art reference,
and other differences were “minor or trivial.” Id. at 1242-43.
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The fact that design patent law still contemplates a three-way
comparison makes it superior to the kind of acontextual compari-
sons that are more common in copyright and trademark law.308 But
we think the more explicit, side-by-side comparison of the patent,
the accused product, and the prior art that was common before
Egyptian Goddess offered courts a chance to focus on scope without
an explicit definition of what is protectable, a desirable feature of
the law that is unfortunately now much harder to achieve. In other
circumstances, expert evidence may be desirable or even necessary
to resolve the scope issues, as is often true today in patent cases, as
well as software and music copyright cases.
An integrated scope proceeding will allow courts to catch cases of
overclaiming, preventing IP owners from extending their rights to
things those rights were never meant to cover.309 At the same time,
an integrated scope proceeding should enable courts to reduce or
eliminate the “busted hand” form of invalidity. Courts can define
the scope of an IP right in ways that cabin it appropriately. Most of
the time, the result will be to preserve the validity of that narrowed
legal right.310
An example of how that might work comes from a 2015 design
patent case in the Federal Circuit, Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v.
Covidien, Inc.311 The design patents there involved surgical devices,
and covered “the overall appearance of the ornamental design of the
‘U’-shaped trigger and the particular ornamental design of a round-
ed and fluted torque knob positioned above and forward from the
308. See supra Part I.A.
309. In Christi Guerrini’s words, a scope proceeding will increase the “faithfulness” of the
legal claim to the proper scope of the IP right. Christi J. Guerrini, Defining Patent Quality,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091, 3131-33 (2014).
310. One important caveat is that sometimes the novel element of a work lies not in any
given component, but in a novel combination of components that are each individually known
before. See Lemley, supra note 24, at 1257, 1270, 1275-76. Patent law has dealt with this
problem in obviousness cases in which the invention is a combination of two or more things
that are individually described in the prior art. See id. at 1265. Patent courts are careful to
avoid assuming in hindsight that it would have been obvious to combine two different things.
See id. at 1254. Copyright courts similarly sometimes worry about losing what is creative
about a work by overdissecting it. See supra note 299 and accompanying text. We agree that
combinations of known elements are often creative and worthy of protection. That said, courts
worry too much about the inability to detect those combinations. If the plaintiff asserts that
it is not any individual element but a novel combination she has contributed, courts in a scope
proceeding can evaluate that claim on its merits. See generally Lemley, supra note 24.
311. 796 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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trigger.”312 One might imagine that the shape of a trigger for a med-
ical device was functional, and indeed the district court so held.313
The Federal Circuit reversed, noting that its test for functionality
in design patents is “stringent” and concluding that because there
were other possible shapes a trigger could take—albeit ones sur-
geons said were not as good—the design was not functional as a
matter of law.314 
So far, so bad—and consistent with the narrowing of functionality
in other cases.315 But then the Federal Circuit did something impor-
tant: it focused on the scope of the resulting patent.316 The district
court, it said, found functionality because it read the design patent
too abstractly, to cover U-shaped triggers and fluted knobs:
Instead of focusing on whether the specific patented designs had
a functional purpose—the continuously curved “U” shape of the
open trigger having tapered handles with ends flaring outwards,
the football-shape of the activation button, and the asymmet-
rically-fluted torque knob with a flat front face—the district
court focused its PHG analysis on the functional characteristics
that any design of an open trigger, button, and torque knob
would have for the underlying ultrasonic shears.317
Thus, while the specific designs were nonfunctional, the functional-
ity of the elements conceived more broadly could still limit the scope
of the patent:
If the overall appearance of a claimed design is not primarily
functional, the design claim is not invalid, even if certain ele-
ments have functional purposes. The scope of that claim, how-
ever, must be limited to the ornamental aspects of the design,
and does not extend to “the broader general design concept.”318
312. Id. at 1327.
313. See id. at 1327-28.
314. Id. at 1328; see id. at 1330-32.
315. See supra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
316. See Ethicon, 796 F.3d at 1333.
317. Id. at 1331.
318. Id. at 1333 (citation omitted) (quoting OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d
1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
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The result was a narrowed patent that the defendant’s product did
not infringe, because its similarities were all at a more abstract,
unprotectable level:
On a general conceptual level, both designs include an open
trigger, a small activation button, and a fluted torque knob in
relatively similar positions within the underlying ultrasonic
device. Similarity at this conceptual level, however, is not suf-
ficient to demonstrate infringement of the claimed designs....
[B]ecause each of these components has a functional aspect, the
underlying elements must be excluded from the scope of the
design claims at this general conceptual level. And when the
remaining ornamental features of those components are com-
pared, as a whole, to the corresponding ornamental features of
Covidien’s accused ultrasonic surgical shears, the dissimilarities
between the designs are plain.319
We think the Federal Circuit approached the infringement part
of Ethicon in exactly the right way. The court focused explicitly on
the scope of the patent and made sure not to let the patentee’s claim
extend to things that were not legally protectable because they were
functional.320 In doing so, it reached the right result in the case be-
fore it (a ruling for defendant) without concluding that there was
nothing at all protectable in the plaintiff ’s design. The court could
do that only because it considered the two issues together, around
the fulcrum of claim construction.
True, some IP rights have no valid scope; they are nothing more
than efforts to claim ownership of something actually created by
someone else or properly dedicated to the public.321 But outright
invalidity of an IP right is relatively uncommon outside of patent
law.322 For instance, a copyright owner has usually created some-
thing, and that something will commonly be deserving of some
protection, even if not very much. Trademark law is somewhere in
between.323 But determining what it is the owner actually created
319. Id. at 1336.
320. See id. at 1328-29, 1333, 1337.
321. See generally supra Part I.A.
322. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
323. Some marks are generic or functional; they are not entitled to any protection at all.
See, e.g., N.Y. Pizzeria, Inc. v. Syal, 56 F. Supp. 3d 875, 881-82 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (rejecting
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requires more than just looking at the work; it requires an assess-
ment of what the IP owner should be entitled to protect in that
work.324
trademark claim to the taste of Italian food). But other marks are entitled to some protection,
even if functionality or distinctiveness limit the proper scope of that protection. See McKenna,
supra note 97, at 843 & n.89.
324. The district court held in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.:
The Copyright Office does not, when a book is offered for copyright, study any
prior art, as does the Patent Office when a patent is sought. It grants the copy-
right, thus putting the protection of the law not only over the copyrighted book
as an entirety, but over the original content of the book. It is then left to the
courts, if litigation ensues, to say what that original content is, and to define the
zone in which the copyright owner is protected.
In defining that zone it always has to be determined: (1) Whether some part
of the zone claimed is not a part of a common ground, the heritage of all man-
kind, usually referred to as the public domain; or (2) whether some of the in-
fringement claimed is not of matter which is not protected by copyright for some
other reason.
Naturally the plaintiff always seeks to widen his protected zone and the
defendant to narrow it.
It follows that the approach of a court to the problem of the infringement of
a play cannot be purely that of an ordinary playgoer, for such a playgoer pre-
sumably has not the opportunity to determine the limits of the protected zone
by the principles above outlined.
7 F. Supp. 837, 843-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (Woolsey, J.).
The Second Circuit reversed:
We are to remember that it makes no difference how far the play was an-
ticipated by works in the public demesne which the plaintiffs did not use. The
defendants appear not to recognize this, for they have filled the record with
earlier instances of the same dramatic incidents and devices, as though, like a
patent, a copyrighted work must be not only original, but new. That is not
however the law as is obvious in the case of maps or compendia, where later
works will necessarily be anticipated. At times, in discussing how much of the
substance of a play the copyright protects, courts have indeed used language
which seems to give countenance to the notion that, if a plot were old, it could
not be copyrighted. But we understand by this no more than that in its broader
outline a plot is never copyrightable, for it is plain beyond peradventure that
anticipation as such cannot invalidate a copyright. Borrowed the work must in-
deed not be, for a plagiarist is not himself pro tanto an “author”; but if by some
magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats’s Ode on a
Grecian Urn, he would be an “author,” and, if he copyrighted it, others might not
copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats’s.... If the copyrighted
work is therefore original, the public demesne is important only on the issue of
infringement.
81 F.2d 49, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, J.) (internal citations omitted).
With due respect to Judge Hand, however, Judge Woolsey seems to have it right. The
relevant question is not merely whether there is a copyright but what the copyright covers.
That question of scope cannot be simply dismissed as relevant only to infringement.
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If the Markman experience is any indication, a scope proceeding
may well resolve many of the disputes over infringement pretrial,
particularly in copyright and design patent cases. Once we know
what a patent does and doesn’t cover, it is a rare case in which the
operation of the defendant’s product is in dispute. Copyright cases
will have more disputes even after courts decide the scope of the
work, because copyright incorporates some measure of market
substitution as well as technical similarity into its infringement
and defense analysis.325 Courts do this today in some software copy-
right cases, applying the Second Circuit’s abstraction-filtration-
comparison test.326 That approach could profitably be expanded to
many other types of copyright cases. Trademark law is more compli-
cated because it depends so heavily on the consumer confusion test,
but even there, identifying unprotectable elements, particularly in
trade dress cases, may make it sufficiently clear that confusion is
unlikely and that summary judgment would be appropriate.327
Scope proceedings may have another benefit in an important class
of cases—those that assert overlapping IP rights. IP regimes have
a variety of doctrines that are designed to channel protection into
one or another regime. One goal of functionality in both copyright
and trademark, for instance, is to force creators who want protec-
tion for the functional aspects of their design to obtain a utility
patent, with its higher threshold for protection and shorter term,
rather than a “backdoor patent” through another IP regime.328 The
idea-expression dichotomy does the same thing in software copy-
right.329 And courts have created an entire new doctrine devoted to
325. See Fromer & Lemley, supra note 25, at 1299-1301, 1300 n.263 (arguing that copy-
right’s fair use doctrine generally requires some form of market substitution as well as
technical similarity before finding infringement).
326. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992). The Tenth
Circuit applies this test to all types of copyright cases, see Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem.
Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993), but it is an outlier.
327. See, e.g., Yvette Joy Liebesman, Rethinking Trademark Functionality as a Question
of Fact, 15 NEV. L.J. 202, 205 (2014) (arguing that functionality should be treated as a legal
conclusion, albeit one with factual underpinnings).
328. See, e.g., McKenna, supra note 97, at 847 & n.105; A. Samuel Oddi, The Functions of
“Functionality” in Trademark Law, 22 HOUS. L. REV. 925, 927-28, 961 (1985) (quoting In re
Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1961)). 
329. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
491 (6th ed. 2012) (“[T]he idea-expression dichotomy channels protection for functional works
toward the patent system, which applies a relatively high threshold for protection (novelty
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preventing IP owners from using trademark law to revive aban-
doned or expired copyrights.330 But those doctrines only work if the
courts are aware of the possibility that one IP regime is being used
to circumvent limits on a different regime. And they are unlikely to
focus on the relationship between the two regimes if only one
doctrine comes before them at a time, particularly if the doctrines
designed to avoid overlap arise in different parts of the case. By
focusing courts’ attention on the nature and scope of the rights at
issue, an integrated scope proceeding is likely to highlight areas of
potential overlap and help the law channel IP claims into the proper
doctrinal category. 
D. Alternatives to a Scope Proceeding
Markman hearings are not costless, and neither would scope
proceedings be in other IP regimes. Adding a hearing requires both
party and judicial resources. We think that cost would be worth it
if we could improve outcomes in IP cases. But we also think that,
on balance, a scope hearing might reduce the cost of IP litigation.
First, a scope hearing will often make it possible to resolve a case
on summary judgment by resolving the underlying disagreement
that has led to litigation. That has been patent law’s experience
with Markman hearings.331 Indeed, one proposal for patent reform
currently pending in Congress is to hold earlier Markman hearings
precisely because doing so will reduce the cost of patent litigation.332
For the same reason, a scope hearing is likely to push many parties
to settle their case before trial. And although a court hearing is
costly, a jury trial is far more costly. Finally, a scope proceeding may
reduce strategic behavior by both parties, reducing the number of
meritless cases or defenses that are raised. So, in the long run, scope
proceedings may prove cost-effective and lead to more accurate re-
sults.
and nonobviousness), requires examination by a skilled examiner, and affords protection for
only 20 years.... Awarding protection for functional works through copyright law—with its low
threshold for protection and much greater duration—would undermine the role of the patent
system.”).
330. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31-32 (2003);
Mark P. McKenna, Dastar’s Next Stand, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 357, 362 & n.15, 366 (2012).
331. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 277, at 977. 
332. See generally Innovation Act of 2015, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015).
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Some kind of integrated mechanism for setting scope is thus
likely a first-best alternative. But if no such mechanism is workable
in copyright or trademark, then we think both copyright and trade-
mark law need to rely more heavily on validity doctrines and more
frequently refuse rights altogether when the scope of protection
ought to be very narrow. As those doctrines are currently constitut-
ed, that solution is less than ideal, because works that are properly
entitled to some protection may be denied protection altogether. But
such an approach should have a salutary long-term effect, driving
copyright and trademark owners, who in the first instance make
claims about the scope of their rights, to aim for narrower rather
than broader rights.
Another compromise might be to allow validity doctrines to be
less than all-or-nothing defenses. If a defendant could prevail by
showing that she was making functional use of a trademark or pat-
ented design, or that she was practicing the prior art in patent law,
courts would implicitly be limiting the scope of the IP rights without
having to make the all-or-nothing decision to invalidate the IP right
altogether. One of us has suggested taking that approach in trade-
mark’s functionality doctrine, for instance.333 And some courts have
taken small steps in that direction, only to have them reversed.334
A final compromise is to raise the bar for infringement. The doc-
trine of virtual identity in copyright law serves this purpose. The
normal test for copyright infringement is “substantial similarity”
between the two works.335 But in some cases, where the rights are
“thin,” courts worry that decisionmakers using the lay observer test
to assess similarity will find infringement based on similarities in
unprotectable rather than protectable elements of a work. Those
courts have not invalidated the copyrights altogether under merger
or originality, but they have raised the threshold for proving in-
fringement, requiring that the defendant’s work be “virtually
identical” to the plaintiff ’s rather than only substantially similar to
333. See generally McKenna, supra note 97.
334. See, e.g., Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d
on reh’g, 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011); Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531
(E.D. Va. 2010), rev’d in relevant part, 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012).
335. As one of us has noted elsewhere, the term “substantial similarity” is unhelpful be-
cause it is itself used to mean two different things in copyright law. See Lemley, supra note
112, at 720-21.
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it.336 The virtual identity standard offers a middle ground between
invalidation and overclaiming, narrowing the effective scope of the
copyright in circumstances in which overclaiming seems likely be-
cause of the limited creativity associated with the work. Virtual
identity seems a logical test to apply to a variety of works in which
creativity is highly constrained, from computer software to pho-
tography. Some have even suggested that we could do something
similar for trademarks, providing narrow protection to “thin
marks.”337 Unfortunately, the application of the doctrine has so far
been uneven and relatively rare.
In short, we need more judicial guidance about the proper scope
of IP rights. That guidance will ideally take the form of identifying
cases of overclaiming and weeding them out pretrial. By contrast,
relying on expert testimony at trial to resolve these issues does not
strike us as a satisfactory solution. Not only is it more costly, but
the experience of the IP system with “technical experts” hired to
testify on each side of any given issue has not been encouraging.
And experimental evidence has shown that juries are guided by
their view of labor and free riding in deciding similarity even when
told to ignore them.338
Even when a jury trial is necessary because critical facts are in
dispute, courts can help guide jury decisions to avoid the gaps we
identify by making clear what similarities cannot be the basis for a
finding of infringement. At a bare minimum, courts can use thresh-
old burdens like the virtual identity standard to try to weed out
cases in which overclaiming is particularly likely. And if none of
these approaches work, courts will have to be more willing to in-
validate IP rights for overclaiming than they have so far proven to
be.
336. See, e.g., Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994);
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974, 977, 979-80 (2d Cir. 1980).
337. Michael Grynberg, Thick Marks, Thin Marks (Dec. 17, 2015) (unpublished manu-
script), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2705082 [https://perma.cc/GQ4K-
XEJM].
338. See Balganesh et al., supra note 155, at 287-88.
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CONCLUSION
Scope is the critical question that underlies all IP regimes.
Surprisingly, it is almost always implicit, not explicit. Because
courts have not paid careful attention to the scope of IP rights, they
have allowed the parties to manipulate the scope of their IP rights
in socially undesirable ways. A more explicit focus on the breadth of
the IP right will lead to better decisions, reducing both the endemic
overclaiming of IP rights and the occasional backlash that invali-
dates those rights altogether.

